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 1. Introduction 
 
In June 2012 delegates from 192 countries met in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in order to attend the 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD). The conference was the 
latest in a series of international conferences on environmental governance that had 
continuously shaped the agenda and political approaches of international environmental and 
development politics. Major stepping stones like the 1972 United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE), the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), 
along with a series of smaller conferences and workshops as well as ground-breaking reports 
like “The Limits to Growth” (Meadows et al. 1972) or “Our Common Future” (WCED 1987) 
played a crucial role in putting environment and development on the international agenda as 
well as connecting the two (see Gosovic 2011 for a historical overview). 
Among the main issues of international environmental governance is climate change, which 
has been debated on internationally since the 1950s (Andresen / Agrawala 2002: 43). The 
issue fully arrived at the agenda of international politics during the 1980s and has since then 
been one of the most intensely debated and contested issues in this field of politics. After the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had been created in 1988, the 1992 
UNCED developed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
which was the first major step in institutionalizing climate change politics by establishing a 
legal regime on climate change at the level of the United Nations. UNFCCC was 
supplemented in 1997 by the Kyoto Protocol, probably the most well-known part of climate 
governance. The Kyoto-Protocol contains fixed reduction targets regarding greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission of countries in its Annex B, along with lists of GHGs covered and sectors 
where emissions were to be reduced. This top-down-style of governance was influenced by 
the perceived success of the Montreal Protocol, that regulated the emissions of ozone 
depleting substances in a similar fashion (see chapter 3). Nevertheless it took until 2005 for 
the Kyoto Protocoll to become effective and its success is quite controversial as many major 
emitters (e.g. USA and China) are not covered and not all countries have achieved their 
respective reduction targets. 
The results for climate governance were twofold: first, along with the further development of 
international climate governance there has also been an increase in institutions and 
organizations relevant for the issue-area. The introduction of market-based mechanisms for 
GHG mitigation has relevance for the international trade regime and the financial markets, 
bilateral cooperations to reduce emissions from deforestation have emerged, clubs like the 
Major Emitters Forum (MEF) or the G-20 have either emerged or started to deal with the issue, 
carbon emissions have started to play a role in internationally funded development projects, 
etc. All this has led to climate governance becoming increasingly complex and taking place in 
what has been called a “regime complex” (e.g. Raustiala / Victor 2004; Keohane / Victor 2011; 
Reischl 2012). 
The second important development regarding international climate governance has to do 
with the deficiencies of the Kyoto Protocol´s top-down-style of governance. More recently, 
especially since the infamous climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009, an alternative mode 
of bottom-up governance has gained importance: one that is characterized by voluntary 
commitments, implementation at the national level and bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
outside the established international system. As the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2020 the latest, 
this style of governance might well evolve into the dominant style of global climate 
governance. 
      2 
 At UNCSD in June 2012 one of the main issues debated was the so-called “green economy”, 
an approach based on ecological modernization theory that aimed to reconcile continuing 
economic growth with environmental concerns. Delegates in Rio wanted to create a 
framework for the international development agenda that contributes to poverty alleviation 
while at the same time steering global patterns of production and consumption towards a 
sustainable way. “The Future We Want” (UN 2012a), the outcome document presented at the 
conference, outlines a vision for a green economy that is quite open to interpretation and 
could best be described as vague. It nevertheless creates a weak international green economy 
regime. While offering ambitious governments and non-state actors occasions to push for a 
large-scale economic transition, it also gives corporations ample opportunities to disguise 
business-as-usual as their respective contribution to a sustainable future. 
Furthermore – and this is my central argument – the framework for a green economy as set 
out at UNCSD will also have repercussions on the climate change regime complex. As the 
issue-areas covered by the two regimes partially overlap, they bear the potential for both, 
negative and positive effects. This paper aims at identifying the central structures of the 
regime complex for climate change and the international green economy regime and 
subsequently analyzing potentials for synergies and conflict. I consider this question of 
importance, as an analysis of these potentials could play an important role for the design of 
national policies as well as international policies and institutions like the future legal regime 
on climate change that is to be negotiated until 2015. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: After a brief methodological overview (chapter 1.1), I 
will first develop the theoretical background of regime complexes (chapter 2). Using this 
background I will elaborate on the development of the regime complex of climate change 
and its important structures and mechanisms (chapter 3). Subsequently I will give an 
overview of the green economy, including its theoretical origins and critical perspectives 
towards the concept (chapter 4). Based on this, I will identify potentials for synergies and 
conflict between the climate regime complex and the green economy regime (chapter 5) and 
wrap the findings up in a conclusion (chapter 6). 
 
It seems worthwhile to give a short overview of the methods I use, in order to help the reader 
evaluate the findings of this paper. 
Chapter 2 focuses on theoretical methods. The evolution of regime complex theory is traced 
in a historical approach: core developments and research questions since the late 1970s are 
outlined. Critical perspectives are presented when appropriate, but the focus is on developing 
a sound understanding to base the analysis on. 
In chapter 3 the development of the climate change regime complex is traced empirically 
using official documents as well as literature from political scientists analyzing the issue from 
an institutionalist perspective. 
Chapter 4 starts with a theoretical part, outlining ecological modernization theory, which is 
the ideological base for green economy. Criticism of the theory, especially from the 
perspective of sustainable development is presented as well. The second part of the chapter 
empirically analyzes green economy as it was framed in the forefront of and during UNCSD as 
well as the conference´s outcome document. This is done by using official documents from 
various UN organizations and national governmental bodies as well as scientific literature – 
mostly in the form of briefing papers – and evaluation papers by non-governmental 
organizations. 
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 Chapter 5 mostly uses hermeneutics in order to interpret UNCSD´s outcome document 
regarding possible synergies and disruptive effects with the climate change regime complex. 
It should be remarked at this point, that the analysis of the potential for interaction regarding 
these effects is quite speculative. UNCSD´s outcome document remained very vague 
regarding the green economy. Also there is no empirical data to be drawn from, as 
governments have yet to formulate green economy policies. Whether and how interaction 
will occur and the question of what is dominating, synergistic or disruptive interactions, is a 
matter of the future. It is not my aim to predict any of these effects with this thesis, but rather 
to highlight potentials for negative or positive effects.  
 
 
 
7 
 2. Theoretical Background 
 
Environmental problems like climate change, the loss of biodiversity, soil degradation, 
desertification or overfishing are of a global nature. This means three things: first, that their 
effects are not limited to national borders. The effects of a changing global climate might 
differ considerably in global comparison. Countries with a high gross domestic product (GDP) 
(i.e. industrialized and, more recently, newly industrialized countries) that might have played 
the biggest role in accelerating anthropogenic climate change will probably have the least 
problems in adapting to climate change, whereas the countries that will feel the most adverse 
effects are those that are the least able to adapt to climate change (developing countries) 
(WBGU 2000: 20). 
This leads us directly to the second denotation: the causes of global environmental problems 
tend to be trans-boundary as well. Even though in some cases certain countries can be 
identified that contribute relatively more to the problem than others (e.g. like in the example 
of climate change), it is usually groups of countries and/or certain destructive patterns of 
production and consumption that are at the heart of the problem. 
Last but not least, the proliferation and global nature of these problems mean that they 
cannot be addressed by actions at the level of the national state, but instead they have to be 
addressed through international cooperation. This trend has found its theoretical reflection in 
the notion of a denationalization of governance (see Zürn 1998). But also local or regional 
environmental problems might occur in a form that requires international cooperation in 
order to solve them: “...a regional drought catastrophe may trigger chain reactions such as 
agriculture production loss, famine and poverty, migration or social unrest” (Rechkemmer 
2004: 29).  
In international politics, the growth in numbers and effects of problems requiring 
international cooperation has led to a proliferation of international cooperation and a growth 
in numbers of international institutions, especially in the environmental sector (Gehring 2004: 
219). 
In political science, regime theory is dealing with the analysis of a certain type of these 
institutions – international regimes. The analysis of these institution delivers an answer as to 
why cooperation can exist and function in an international system that is conceptualized as 
being characterized by full anarchy of the international system and a lack of hegemonial 
structures (Osterheld 2010: 5). 
 
2.1. Historical Perspective 
 
Regime theory developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s and due to its focus on 
international institutions it has been described as a neo-institutionalist theory (Zangl 2003: 
131). Especially in the USA, where students of International Relations (IR) have traditionally 
been proficient with the theory of political ´realism´ (Cohen 2008: 27) – and since the late 
1970 ´neorealism´ (Schörnig 2010: 65) – the collapse of the Bretton Woods System of fixed 
exchange rates and the Oil Crises during the 1970s led to a critical discussion of the nature of 
international relations and especially two of the premises of neorealism: first, that 
international cooperation is only possible if there is a hegemonial power asserting it towards 
the other nations, and second, that international institutions thus are a mere instrument of 
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 the hegemon (Zürn 2010: 131). In contrast to this, regime theory asserts that even in the 
absence of a hegemonial power1 international cooperation is possible if the involved states 
share mutual interests and because of this it can help to reduce the problems resulting from 
increasing interdependence (Ibid: 132). It has been highlighted that due to the mentioned 
historical events, the formation of regime theory can be seen as guided by a politically 
motivated cognitive interest on the types of ideal policy design (Kohler-Koch 1989: 17). 
The notion of interdependence is important here, as the study of mutual interdependencies 
between nation states was the basis from which regime theory developed. Especially the 
economic shocks of the 1970s led to increasing scholarly attention being paid to the ways in 
which states influence each other with their behavior (Spindler 2010: 99). The key to these 
interdependencies was seen “in the increasing fragmentation and diffusion of power in 
economic affairs, stemming from the growing interconnectedness of national economies. […] 
States might still be central actors in international affairs, but with the expansion of the global 
marketplace they could no longer claim sole authority to determine outcomes.” (Cohen 2008: 
28). The notion of interdependence also enhances the analytical perspective on relevant 
actors and contrasts with the realist notion of states as the exclusive actors in international 
relations: “Economic interdependence was spawning a growing swarm of transnational actors 
– individuals and entities whose control of resources and access to channels of 
communication enabled them, too, to participate meaningfully in political relationships 
across state lines.” (Ibid.) 
On the forefront of the intellectual debate in the late 1970s were Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye who further elaborated the notion of interdependence into a perspective of “complex 
interdependence” (see Keohane / Nye 2004) which basically reverses the core assumptions of 
realism (Spindler 2010: 107): There are assumed to be “multiple channels of communications, 
an absence of hierarchy among issues, and a diminished role for military force” (Cohen 2008: 
27). Hence, as Ernst Haas puts it, “complex interdependence implies that we can no longer 
explain state behavior on the basis of a given international configuration” (Haas 1980: 359). 
This strain of analysis has been criticized (not only from realists) for not sufficiently explaining 
the nature of the forces that establish interdependencies (Spindler 2010: 121). Keohane and 
Nye´s new way of thinking would later become to be known under the label neoliberal 
institutionalism (Cohen 2008: 95). 
While complex interdependence can be seen as an analytical instrument for describing the 
structure of international relations, there was still a need to explain the conditions under 
which cooperation becomes likely (Zangl 2010: 138). Furthermore, it needs to be specified, 
what exactly cooperation means in this context: “Cooperation has been famously defined by 
Keohane as a mutual adjustment of behavior achieved through a formal or informal process 
of policy coordination” (Cohen 2008: 100). Regimes are in this sense catalysts for cooperation 
as they help the states to enable cooperation by securing expectations towards future 
behavior and by reducing the transaction costs of international cooperation (Zangl 2010: 
139). The most prevalent definition of regimes has been put forward by Stephen Krasner: 
 
“Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making structures around which actors´ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are 
standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific 
1 See Keohane (1984) for a more detailed discussion of the role of hegemony and the nature of cooperation in the international sphere. One of his key 
arguments is that international cooperation occurs because the actors repeatedly interact with each other. Game theory´s Prisoner´s Dilemma exemplifies this: 
whereas single games do not make cooperation desirable, the iteration of the game makes cooperation much more likely. 
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 prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making structures are prevailing practices 
for making and implementing collective choice.” (Krasner 1982: 186) 
 
The problem with this definition is: who are these actors2? It does not seem plausible to 
count only nation states as actors. In the case of the climate regime for example, the IPCC has 
played an important role in creating knowledge on which governments based their decisions. 
The IPCC certainly does not qualify as an actor of international relations in terms of economic 
or military power, but it certainly has shaped the form of the climate regime as it presents 
itself today. Similarly, the behavior of states in the negotiations of environmental regimes has 
been described as the result of discussions, lobbyism and political pressure from stakeholders 
(Osterheld 2010: 8). It thus seems plausible to extend the analysis of international regimes to 
the behavior of non-state actors in addition to nation states. 
The study of regimes has been criticized for not paying sufficient attention to turf-struggles 
and conflicting interests (Stokke 2001: 3). On a more general account, the concept of regimes 
has been criticized for being a) a fad, b) imprecise, c) value-biased, d) putting too much value 
on static elements instead of changing dimensions of politics, and e) state-centric and lacking 
a perspective on the socio-economic imbalances in power (see Strange 1982 for further 
elaboration; see also Bieling 2010). 
To sum it up, the key issues we need to keep in mind when we are dealing with regimes are: 
regimes are a form of cooperation that produces a) principles, b) rules, c) norms and d) 
decision making structures. I will use the next section to exemplify this using the example of 
the climate change regime. 
 
 
2.2. Constituting Factors of Regimes 
 
Since we will be talking about the climate regime it makes sense to take a few examples from 
the climate regime in order to demonstrate the features of a regime. 
We have mentioned that regimes are a form of cooperation within a certain area of 
international relation. A more precise term that can often be found is issue-are (e.g.; Young 
1996; Stokke 2001, Young 2004; Joyner 2005; Biermann et al. 2009 just to name a few), 
referring to the regime relating to a certain problem or phenomenon. This term also allows 
for a “reasonably clear delimitation of regimes” (Stokke 2001: 2). The ultimate goal of 
cooperation is the solution of a problem, although it has to be remembered that some 
problems might be solved by a single case of cooperation whereas others might require 
ongoing efforts (Young 2004: 6). The latter is the case for the climate regime, as continuing 
efforts will be necessary to keep the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at an 
acceptable level. 
So where exactly can we find principles, rules, norms and decision-making structures in the 
international regime dealing with climate change? 
 
2 It is important to note that international regimes unlike international organizations do not qualify as actors (Zangl 2010: 133). 
10 
                                                 
 Increasing amounts of greenhouse gases3 in the Earth´s atmosphere will lead to an increase 
in global average temperature, that will have impacts on various ecologic and social systems 
up to full scale catastrophes in the form of irreversible changes in these systems (principles). 
The emissions of greenhouse gases therefore need to be monitored and regulated by 
cooperation as far as possible (norms). 
The specific commitments by certain states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions are 
fixed in an international treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, which also includes specific mechanisms 
by which these reductions are to be achieved (rules). 
Another international treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) specifies rules of procedure for regular meetings of its members as well as specific 
processes to reach collective agreements (decision-making structures). 
 
Now that we have developed a basic idea about what constitutes a regime, we can shift our 
focus to the question of how a regime actually forms in a certain issue-area4. Roughly during 
the first decade of regime study this question had been the focus of academic interest in 
regimes, before a shift to the study of regime effectiveness occurred during the 1990s (Stokke 
2001: 1). About another decade later academic interest again shifted to the study of 
institutional interplay and regime complexes. 
 
 
2.3. Regime Formation 
 
It is important to note, as Beate Kohler-Koch (1989: 29) has highlighted, that the pure 
objective necessity/desirability of a regime for a certain issue-area does not say anything 
about the likelihood of the formation of a regime in that area and that believing otherwise 
would be a functionalist false conclusion. 
Typically, regime formation is divided into three different stages: agenda-setting, negotiation 
and operationalization (Andresen / Agrawala 2002: 42; see chapter 3.1.1 for an example of 
such a process). 
The first step in the formation of a regime is the successful linkage of issue-areas by those 
actors that have an interest in solving (or not solving) a perceived problem (Haas 1980: 371). 
We owe to Ernst Haas an illustrative example for this mechanism:  
“The United States and the Soviet Union […] saw no reason to link the issues of peaceful 
nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons as long as each was able to control 
the process of technological diffusion. The desire to construct the proliferation regime arose 
only when the process seemed to pass out of their control.” (Ibid.). 
The mentioned example also highlights two important features of regime, namely the fact 
that they are the results of a process of communication: “International regimes are best 
3 In this case carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexaflouride and the chemical groups of hydroflourocarbons (HFCs) and perflourocarbons 
(PFCs) and nitrogen trifluoride.  
4 Theorists – and maybe especially those from the humanities – are prone to be influenced by their historical context. Thus differences in the focus of 
regime studies can be observed as Steffi Osterheld (2010: 6) has highlighted: whereas regime research in the USA tended to focus more on the decline in US 
hegemony and political economy more generally, studies in Europe focused more on security issues in East-West-relations and have been complemented later on 
by studies on international cooperation on environmental issues. 
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 understood as decision making systems beyond the nation state that shape the expectations 
of relevant actors. They are more or less dynamic and evolve over time as collective decisions 
are made and practices of governance change.” (Gehring 2004: 222; see also Gehring / 
Oberthür 2004: 248). Regimes generally tend to evolve in a procedural way due to four 
reasons: first, consensus regarding the problem often needs to be built up; second, a process 
allows for trial and error; third, the knowledge base regarding the regime might change; and 
lastly, the trust nation states need to develop for an international regime to function is usually 
the result of a long process of successful cooperation (Bodansky / Diringer 2010: 3-4). This 
procedural evolution means that regimes evolve “in path-dependent, historically shaped 
ways” (Keohane / Victor 2011: 9). 
In the study of international environmental regimes the processes of communication can be 
observed quite well in the international conferences that have played a vital role over the last 
four decades in establishing these regimes “through intensive international conference 
diplomacy” (Joyner 2005: 92). The example of the climate regime will later show us that 
leadership asserted by individuals and groups plays an important role in the formation of 
regimes (for an overview see Young 1991).  
We should now first shift our attention to two factors that influence the formation of regimes: 
first, the involved actors and their respective interests and second, the institutional and 
organizational environment (Haas 1980: 30-35). 
It has been mentioned earlier that the involved actors are not limited to national states. 
“Under conditions of complex interdependence, state interests will reflect the interests of the 
major constituencies that exert influence over state leaders” (Keohane / Victor 2010: 3). This 
can be firms (Tienhaara et al. 2012: 59), non-governmental organizations (Frantz / Martens 
2006: 58-61), social movements (Voss 2007: 32) or sub-national government entities – often 
with differing positions inside and between these groups. Nevertheless, nation states are core 
actors in regime formation, as they are the ones signing the treaties and implementing the 
commitments. In analyzing the involved actors, their interests (perceived, expressed and 
factual) are of crucial importance. Especially the coherence of alliances formed by similar 
actors is important, as for example “...business conflict can severely impede efforts on the part 
of global corporations to prevent the creation of environmental regimes or to shape their 
development” (Tienhaara et al. 2012: 62). 
A quite specific case of regime formation occurs when there is a hegemonial power and it 
uses its influence to establish a regime that serves its interest, however as “world politics lacks 
authoritative governmental institutions, and is characterized by pervasive uncertainty” 
(Keohane 1982: 332), this case is rather unlikely in contemporary politics. The Bretton Woods 
System as it was established after World War II might serve as an example, as the USA´s 
influence on its creation was large and the USA used it in order to promote their own 
interests. 
If there is a lack of a hegemonial power and the actors share converging interests in the issue-
area as well as the desirable solutions, cooperation is likely to occur (Kohler-Koch 1989: 30). 
This is the case if all the involved actors are relatively equally impacted by the problem as for 
example in the rhine regime (Ibid), a case that is quite rare as individual interests tend to 
influence the actors perception of a problem. 
If there are converging interests on the one hand, but no consensus about desired outcomes, 
the regime will require a lot more negotiations and even trade-offs between key actors5. This 
5 A prominent example for this is the Kyoto Protocol. It was supposed to enter into force once it had been ratified by a minimum of 55 states that account 
for combined GHG emissions of 55% in relation to 1990. As it became clear that the US would not ratify it due to the Bryd-Hagel-Resolution (see Paterson 2009 and 
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 is the case for most environmental regimes, where we are often dealing with different 
perceptions of environment which are usually highly normative (Kohler-Koch 1989: 31).  
Much more often, interests tend to be divergent and the structure of a regime is thus the 
result of a long process of negotiations. 
There is also a procedural dimension of regime formation that has to do with the relation of 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making structures. A set of principles and norms can be 
complemented by several sets of rules and decision-making structures and the latter two 
might change over time without changing the character of the regime. On the other hand, if 
the principles and norms change, this also changes the regime itself and thus either leads to a 
new regime or the abolishment of the old regime (see Osterheld 2010: 8). Ernst Haas (1980: 
367-370) has highlighted the role that knowledge and changes in knowledge play in these 
processes. 
The second important factor besides the actors that influences regime formation is the 
institutional and organizational environment. On an abstract basis, most “issue-specific 
regimes in international society are deeply embedded in overarching institutional 
arrangements in the sense that they assume – normally without saying explicitly so – the 
operation of a whole suit of broader principles and practices that constitute the deep 
structure of international society as a whole” (Young 1996: 2-3). States tend to follow the 
realist notion of international society as a society of states and thus it is hard for non-state 
actors to gain direct access to decision-making structures (Ibid.). Also, international 
bureaucracies as for example the system of the UN can play important roles in the formation 
of regimes (Bauer et al. 2012). There are also non-explicit rules and norms in the sense of a 
kind of international culture that predetermine the way regimes might or might not form. 
These cultural factors are not fixed, but instead “major forces for change such as globalization 
have made the current era a period of considerable dynamism regarding the basic character 
of international society.” (Young 2004: 10).  
If we look at the role international organizations play in the formation of regimes they can 
influence the process of formation in three ways: first, by creating a forum in which 
international cooperation can take place (as for example the UN-system does for large 
international conferences which might spawn a regime), second, by being an actor in itself 
that provides necessary preconditions for action (as for example the IPCC does for the climate 
regime) or third, by being an actor in the formation process of a regime (as for example WTO 
does for the global trade regime) (Kohler-Koch 1989: 32). 
Once formed, a regime is unlikely to stay the way it is, as regime formation is a continuing and 
evolutionary process. Regimes can evolve along multiple lines: first, by deepening through 
institutional evolution, changing its legal form, increasing its precision6 or by further 
elaborating its compliance and dispute settlement mechanisms; second, by gradually 
broading either its substantive scope or its membership base; and third, by further 
integrating its work through institutional linking or consolidation7 in order to achieve better 
coordination and better results (Bodansky / Diringer 2010: 5-11). Of course these paths of 
Harrison 2010a), passed by the US Congress, Russia´s ratification was supposedly ´traded´ for supporting Russia´s application to WTO (Paterson 2009: 141 and 
Henry / McIntosh Sundstrom 2010: 116).   
6 A type of institutional development that can be observed in the „framework convention / protocol approach“ (Bodansky / Diringer 2010: 7) which is 
quite common in environmental politics: „First a framework convention is adopted, establishing the basic system of governance for a given issue area. Then, 
regulatory requirements are negotiated in a protocol to the convention” (Bodansky 2011b: 2). Examples are the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and its Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity and its Nagoya and Cartagena Protocols (for the latter see Falkner 2006) or the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol. Nevertheless, this approach is not exclusive to the sphere of environmental 
governance, as can be seen in the World Health Organization´s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and it´s Protocol on Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (which 
is as of May 2012 in the final phase of international negotiations).  
7 As was for example the case with the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East-Atlantic (OSPAR-Convention) which 
derived out of the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from by Dumping from Ships and Aircrafts (Oslo Convention) and the Convention for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources (Paris Convention). 
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 regime evolution are not mutually exclusive and often go hand in hand with each other (Ibid: 
11-12). Transnational corporations for example can differ in the positions they take regarding 
accepting, supporting or challenging the implementation of a regime and can therefore play 
a crucial role towards the further development of regimes (Tienhaara et al. 2012: 56).  
 
2.4. Regime Consequences 
 
It has already been mentioned earlier, that during the 1990s the academic interest in regimes 
shifted its attention from the formation and change of regimes to the study of their 
effectiveness (Stokke 2001). At the core of these studies are questions concerning the 
consequences of regimes: what impacts do regimes have? When is a regime to be considered 
successful? What are conditions under which a regime is more likely to be successful? What 
kind of methodological challenges do we face in the study of regime consequences? 
It should be stressed that the study of regime consequences should not stop at the 
consequences of a specific regime, but that we also have to pay attention to the specific 
processes that lead to the formation of a regime, as “[t]hese processes generate their own 
consequences.” (Underdal 2004: 32; italics in original). 
Also, organizational analysis is an important tool when assessing a regime´s effectiveness, as 
“[o]rganizations are responsible in most regimes for implementing or administering the rules 
of the game; their actions play an important role in determining the size and character of the 
familiar gap between the rules on paper and the rules in use. Also organizations […] often 
play critical roles in (re)forming institutional arrangements. The rules of the game in many 
issue areas bear the imprint of the preferences of organizations capable of wielding influence 
in processes of regime formation” (Young 2008: 16) 
The study of regime consequences can be broadly split into two sub-fields: the study of 
simple regime effectiveness and the study of broader regime consequences. 
The study of simple effectiveness assesses regimes “in terms of how well they perform a 
particular function or the extent to which they achieve their purpose” (Ibid: 27). Effectiveness 
studies usually leave out two things: the costs of establishing and operating a regime 
(efficiency) and relations of power (fairness) (Ibid). A necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
for effectiveness is strength, that is a) the ability of a regime to constrain certain forms of 
behavior and b) its ability to subject these forms to collective governance instead of 
individual decisions (Ibid: 29). A second important factor that determines a regime´s 
effectiveness is its robustness, that is its ability “to cope with challenges and survive stress 
with its functioning capacity intact”. (Ibid: 30). Robustness depends on a couple of factors, the 
most important ones being legitimacy, resilience and adaptability (Ibid: 30-31). 
The study of simple effectiveness is carried out to a large degree through case studies, but 
one problem in this area is the lack of a general methodology and a tendency of scientists to 
create too ambitious research designs that in turn reduce the comparability of the studies 
(see Andresen / Wettestad 2004 for their experiences from over a decade as case study 
workers on regime effectiveness). Jon Hovi (2004) has also highlighted that the comparability 
of studies further decreases by a lack of a common definition of the term ´mechanism´, as well 
as researchers not making the effort to explicitly define their understanding of it. 
Furthermore, the analysis of regime effectiveness gets complicated even more by increasing 
institutional interaction between different regimes and an increasing overlap of several 
regimes addressing similar issue-areas. Especially in the field of environmental regimes, 
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 international cooperation is increasingly characterized by nested, overlapping and parallel 
institutions (Reischl 2012: 2). I will return to this phenomenon in the next chapter when 
dealing with regime complexes.  
The unit of analysis thus needs to be carefully defined when conducting studies about the 
effectiveness of regimes and we need to remember “that the consequences we attribute to a 
particular regime will often be ´co-products´ in the sense described above” (Underdal 2004: 
33; quotation marks in original). 
If we want to analyze a regime´s effectiveness we first need to clarify what the regime has 
actually produced in order to solve the problems in its respective issue-area. Therefore an 
analysis of the output of a regime is always the first step. The actual effects of the output can 
be analyzed on two levels: first, the regime´s outcome, that is its effect on human behavior, 
and second, the regime´s impact, that is the level to which it has actually solved the problem 
it is addressing (Ibid: 34). The assessment of the latter can get quite complicated for political 
scientists as many regimes – especially in the environmental field – address issues that require 
substantial knowledge in other disciplines (Ibid.). The climate regime again serves as a good 
example in this case: due to the complex nature of the problem, political decision making 
needs to be based on the results of a broad field of natural and social sciences. The IPCC was 
established after the 1988 Toronto Conference of the Atmosphere (Andresen / Agrawala 
2002) in order to provide this expert advice and to give the international community a sound 
– or positivist8 – scientific base for their collective as well as the respective national states´ 
actions. 
In assessing the effectiveness of a regime, Arild Underdal (2004: 40-42) has identified three 
factors determining the variance in the effectiveness of different regimes: “the nature of the 
problem, characteristics of the group of parties, and properties of the regime itself” (Ibid: 40). 
There does not seem to be academic consensus concerning the methodological tools best 
used in the assessment of regime effectiveness, although Underdal argues that the complex 
nature of regimes requires to “find creative ways of combining methodological strategies that 
are sometimes seen as competing and embedded in incompatible epistemological positions” 
(Ibid: 42). 
The second major sub-field of the study of regime consequences is concerned with the 
broader consequences of regimes. “Broader consequences research focuses on regime effects 
that occur beyond a given regime and the issue area governed by it. It is an attempt to 
expand the study of regime effectiveness to those effects that have been ignored so far.” 
(Gehring 2004: 220). 
This type of research focuses on four areas (Ibid: 225-233): First, the impact regimes have on 
other issue-areas beyond their own9, second, the influence international regimes assert on 
each other10, third, the impact that regimes have on one or several domestic political 
systems11, and fourth, the influence a regime exerts on the international system itself12. For 
8 For the role of positivism and the relationship between politics and science see Dessler / Parson 2010 
9 For example, if we look at the efforts to regulate the benefits derived from biological resources, these are not only affected by the biodiversity regime 
(especially the Convention on Biological Diversity´s Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
Their Utilization), by the international trade regime and especially the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and also by two 
agreements under the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). See Raustiala / Victor 2004 for a detailed analysis of the international 
regulations regarding plant genetic resources. 
10 This is especially the case in the field of environmental regimes, where there are frequent overlaps as can be seen in the efforts to prevent pollution of 
the North-East Atlantic. These are influenced by various regimes (e.g. OSPARCOM, the Stockholm Convention, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution, the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine). In this case the EU also plays an important role with its Marine Strategy Framework Directive as 
well as with the EU´s member states implementing the directive on the national level. 
11 For example, labour standards introduced by the ILO may affect the labour legislation of a national state, as their existence gives non-state actors a 
point of reference in relation to which they can mobilize support by actively campaigning for legislative changes. 
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 the questions addressed by this paper the second type of interaction is of special interest as 
the Green Economy framework developed at UNCSD bears the characteristics of a regime and 
thus the interaction with the existing climate regime (or climate regime complex as we will 
later find out) can be framed as an interaction between regimes. For this reason, during the 
course of the next chapter, I shall elaborate on the area of regime interaction. 
 
2.5. Regime Interaction 
 
The number of international institutions is constantly increasing and even though they are 
usually established separately from each other, they increasingly affect each others´ 
performances (Gehring / Oberthür 2004: 247). An example is the transnational forestry regime 
based on the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) which incorporates labor standards and by 
this contributes to implementing the core labor norms of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) (Pattberg 2012: 106).  
Building upon the established approaches for the analysis of regime consequences 
mentioned above, Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür (2009) have established a 
framework for analyzing the causal mechanisms of regime interaction.  
For them “[i]nstitutional interaction will exist if one institution (the source institution) affects 
the development or performance of another institution (the target institution). (…) Causation 
implies that an effect observed within the target institution or its issue-area is attributable to 
another institution so that we would not expect the effect to occur in the absence of the 
source institution.” (Ibid: 127). The effects of institutional interaction on the target institution 
can be positive (that is creating synergies), negative (that is creating disruption) or neutral 
(that is not clearly supporting or hindering the target institution´s objectives) (Ibid: 128). 
Causal interactions of this type are helpful for including a perspective on actors in the analysis 
of institutional interactions and thus provide a link between the macro-level (the institutions) 
and the micro-level (the actors in the institutions). Figure 1 visualizes the processes of these 
types of mechanisms. 
Gehring and Oberthür furthermore highlight that institutional interaction can affect all three 
levels of effectiveness, namely the output, the outcome and the impact of an institution 
(Gehring / Oberthür 2009: 131). 
A challenge for the study of regime interaction is the nature of these interactions: usually, 
these situations include a group of several interactions and thus need to be broken down into 
several single interactions as they would otherwise not qualify for an appropriate unit of 
analysis (Gehring / Oberthür 2004: 250). Gehring and Oberthür (2009) have elaborated four 
ideal and mutually exclusive types of institutional interactions that one can use for analyzing 
cases of institutional interaction: 
 first, there is cognitive interaction which is concerned with the provision of information or 
ideas and that can create synergistic, neutral or disruptive effects; second, there is interaction 
through commitment which is concerned with vertical or horizontal policy diffusion and that 
leads to synergistic effects; third, there is behavioral interaction which deals with behavioral 
adjustments by states and non-state actors that can lead to synergistic or disruptive effects; 
and fourth, there is impact-level interaction, that is the influence on the ultimate governance 
12 One might think of the effects regimes have on state sovereignty, the reduction of conflict in the international system, the empowerment of non-state 
actors and organizations and the effects on the increasing juridification of the international system (Gehring 2004: 231). 
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 target of an institution and that can be synergistic, disruptive or neutral (see Gehring / 
Oberthür 2009 for further elaboration). 
 
A problem with these classifications of interactions is that they are ideal and mutually 
exclusive. It seems unlikely that interactions between regimes will be limited to one of these 
mechanisms at a time. 
This could theoretically be solved by breaking down a chain of interactions into several single 
steps, but the question is, how to actually measure and identify these types of interactions. 
Cognitive interaction for example might not always be clearly visible and thus seems hard to 
observe.  
Nevertheless does the framework by Gehring and Oberthür (2004 and 2009) deliver a solid 
basis for the analysis of regime interactions. Due to the lack of a common methodology it 
seems like a good starting point for future research in this field and thus might contribute to 
the emergence of comparable quantitative research and ultimately more general results 
regarding the mechanisms that drive the interaction of regimes. 
Ultimately the study of interactions between regimes has led to the insight that the 
international sphere is witnessing an increasing “density of international regimes” (Young 
1996: 1) that increasingly affect each other. The reasons for this development have been 
twofold: first, due to a growing complexity on the international level, the number of problems 
that are intertwined with others has been increasing (Haas, 2004: 2), and second, there has 
been a “proliferation of new political actors and a diffusion of political authority over major 
governance functions, especially in the environmental sphere. These new actors include 
NGOs, MNCs, organized transnational scientific networks known as epistemic communities, 
global policy networks, and selective international institutions that are capable of exercising 
discretionary behavior independently of their dominant member states.” (Ibid). Since the late 
1970s the constellations of actors in the field of environmental governance have become 
increasingly complex as environmental governance has evolved from a unidirectional process 
of governments regulating polluters into a multi-level interplay of governments, civil-society 
and business actors (Jänicke 2008: 561). The cube in Figure 2 demonstrates how multi-level 
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 governance structures deal with several issue-areas and provide opportunities to exert 
pressure on decision makers from multiple directions and across multiple issue-areas. 
 
 
Issue-areas like climate change (see Keohane / Victor 2011), forestry (see Reischl 2012; also 
Pattberg 2012) or plant genetic resources (see Raustiala / Victor 2004) have evolved into 
complex systems13 with an increasing number of actors and are covered by a multitude of 
regimes, thus leading to the emergence of what is called a regime complex. These 
institutional complexes shall be the focus of the next section. 
 
2.6. Regime Complexes 
 
The first notion of the term regime complex is commonly attributed (see for example 
Keohane / Victor 2011; Reischl 2012; Abbott 2011) to Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor who 
used the term to describe the international regulatory framework governing plant genetic 
resources (2004). Scholars of international regimes have nevertheless been thinking about 
similar types of structures since the 1990s and framed them for example as a growing 
“density of international regimes” (Young 1996) or regime “overlap” (Stokke 1999). They were 
led by the insight that “international cooperation in general has increasingly become more 
institutionalized over the past decades” (Reischl 2012: 2). Neo-gramscians have conducted 
13 “A complex system is a system with a large number of elements, building blocks or agents capable of interacting with each other and with their 
environment. Scholars who study complexity note that within complex systems, knowledge about the elementary building blocks – a termite, a neutron, a single 
rule – does not even give a glimpse of the behavior of the whole, and may lead to faulty understandings of the building blocks themselves. (…) [W]e can study 
the Kyoto Protocol, but doing so will not ultimately help us understand how global warming gets addressed.“ (Alter / Meunier 2009: 14) 
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 similar analyzes albeit with a focus on the role regulation and its initiators´ interests play in 
existing and upcoming markets (e.g. Görg / Brand 2006). 
Instead of focusing on the analysis of individual institutions, issue-areas or political actors, the 
study of regime complexes has been described as a rather holistic or systemic approach to 
the study of international cooperation: “To think in terms of international regime complexity 
is to study interactive relationships and analyze how the whole shapes the pieces” (Alter / 
Meunier 2009: 21).  
With Raustiala and Victor we can define a regime complex as “an array of partially overlapping 
and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area. Regime complexes are 
marked by the existence of several legal agreements that are created and maintained in 
distinct fora with participation of different sets of actors. The rules in these elemental regimes 
functionally overlap, yet there is no agreed upon hierarchy for resolving conflicts between 
rules. Disaggregated decision making in the international legal system means that 
agreements reached in one forum do not automatically extend to, or clearly trump, 
agreements developed in other forums [sic].” (Raustiala / Victor 2004: 279).14 
Building on this definition, the increasing number of actors and rules in decision-making 
processes for international cooperation has been conceptualized as “international regime 
complexity” (Alter / Meunier 2009: 13). “International regime complexity refers to the 
presence of nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not 
hierarchically ordered. Although rule complexity also exists in the domestic realm, the lack of 
hierarchy distinguishes international regime complexity, making it harder to resolve where 
political authority over an issue resides” (Ibid.).   
The formation of a regime complex is the result of divergent interests of the involved actors. 
Even if a consensus regarding the principles guiding action in a certain issue-area is reached, 
there might still be differing opinions about the rules and norms that should be applied. Only 
if there is broad consensus about these issues among all major actors, a comprehensive 
regime as we have defined it in chapter 2.3 might form: “Powerful demand by all key players 
around a common objective yields a single institution and no viable rivals” (Keohane / Victor 
2010: 4). But often the relevant actors might not agree about the rules, norms and decision-
making structures of a regime, as was the case in the formation of the climate regime 
complex (see Andresen / Agrawala 2002 for an introduction). One approach applied by policy 
makers in these cases is the establishment of a framework convention, in scientific research 
often referred to as a nested regime. These do not initially contain any specific obligations 
and can later be complemented by protocols containing more specific regulations as the 
result of further negotiations. 
Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier (2009: 14) have argued that other reasons for the formation 
of regime complexes can be spillovers from one topic to another, sub-groups of states 
desiring stronger regulations and thus forming separate agreements, or the negotiation of 
linkages between different agreements in order to make them more desirable. Additionally, 
states can be interested in the creation of “strategic inconsistencies” (Raustiala / Victor 2004: 
301), that is agreements creating insecurity about how to interpret the regulations in a certain 
issue-area. This is to effectively prevent cooperation in the issue-area. A similar mechanism 
could also be used to create several agreements for the same issue-area in order to secure 
cooperation should one of them fail (Alter / Meunier 2009: 14). 
14 The regime complex for plant genetic resources for example that Raustiala and Victor analyze is comprosed of five elemental regimes that share several 
common overlaps: the 1961 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO)´s 1983 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources and it´s 2002 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources, the Consultative Group on 
International Agriculture Research (CGIAR), the World Trade Organization (WTO)´s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the 
1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Raustiala / Victor 2004: 283-284) 
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 Especially in large issue-areas like climate change or biodiversity it is likely that there are 
several narrow regimes covering the issues or sub-issues in these fields. This leads to a 
fragmentation of governance that is likely to produce synergies but also disruptions, if 
institutions are not carefully designed. Another problem of these complex regulatory bodies 
is “forum shifting” (Keohane / Victor 2010: 4), sometimes also referred to as “forum shopping” 
(Busch 2007: 736, see also Raustiala / Victor 2004: 299-300). It describes “strategies where 
actors select international venues based on where they are best able to promote specific 
policy preferences, with the goal of eliciting a decision that favors their interest” (Alter / 
Meunier 2009: 16). Examples for this can be found in international trade disputes (see Busch 
2007 and Raustiala / Victor 2004 for examples). A potential danger of forum shopping is the 
induction of a race to the bottom as schemes compete by lowering their standards (Abbott 
2011: 13). Even though forum shopping is arguably the most commonly discussed 
consequence of regime complexes, scholars still argue how common it is in reality (Alter / 
Meunier 2009: 17).  
To sum up, regime complexes are likely to exist where there are diverging interests and a lack 
of a hegemonial power15: “When patterns of interests (shaped by beliefs constrained by 
information and weighted by power) diverge to a greater or lesser extent, major actors may 
prefer a regime complex to any feasible comprehensive, highly integrated, institution” 
(Keohane / Victor 2010: 4). 
The formation of a regime complex is thus the result of competition among actors aiming for 
more integration and those aiming for more fragmentation. If there is consensus regarding 
the appropriate ways to deal with an issue-area, even under international regime complexity, 
actors will quickly move to coordinate and harmonize the different rules (Alter / Meunier 
2009: 20) 
Regime complexes have two advantages over single regimes: first, they are more flexible in 
the sense that they can adapt to specific conditions and certain actors or coalitions more 
easily and, second, they can adapt more easily to changing circumstances, as they need not to 
change the whole regime (Keohane / Victor 2011: 16) 
Now that we have developed an understanding of what regime complexes are, an important 
question remains: do regime complexes matter? Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier have 
addressed the question of regime complex consequences in a study and have identified five 
ways in which regime complexity “changes the strategies and dynamic interactions of actors” 
(2009): 
 
First, implementation politics become more important. Due to the fragmentation and 
ambiguity of rules and law, states implementation behavior influences which rules will 
become dominant or marginalized. 
Second, cross institutional strategies like forum shopping, strategic inconsistencies and 
regime shifting are becoming possible. The latter are efforts (often pursued by groups of 
states, e.g. the G77) to reshape the global structure of rules as opposed to forum shopping 
which serves individual actors´ goals. 
Third, complexity creates increasing importance of and reliance on experts (experts, lawyers 
and NGOs). Since causal effects are not always easy to identify, unintended feedback effects 
are becoming more likely and there are also ample opportunities for actors to actively engage 
in the framing of political issues. 
15 It has to be noted though that the forming processes of regime complexes are far from being fair and democratic processes. Instead dominant powers 
are able to exert relatively more influence on these processes as well as on their outcomes than weaker actors (Drezner 2009). 
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 Fourth, the multitude of international venues creates more opportunities for interaction 
among government representatives and thus increases the influence of social networks. This 
can have positive effects, e.g. because trust (a necessary condition for continued international 
cooperation) can be built up, as well as negative effects, e.g. by inter- and intra-group rivalries 
and a lack of accountability mechanisms. 
Fifth, regime complexity can have several feedback effects: it might create competition 
among actors and institutions, increase chances for unintended reverberations in other 
domains, undermine accountability, increase the value of loyalty and trust and open up 
multiple-exit strategies for actors, e.g. through non-compliance, regime shifting and the 
withdrawal from international organizations. 
 
Keohane and Victor (2011) have also suggested a set of six criteria for the evaluation of 
regime complexes: coherence16; accountability17; determinacy18; sustainability19; 
epistemic quality20; and fairness21 (Ibid: 16-17). It should be noted though, that the nature of 
international relations makes it unlikely for a regime complex to rank highly regarding all 
these normative criteria (Ibid. 17).  
Of course regime complex theory has not been without criticism: one has been the focus of 
regime complex literature on inter-state regimes (Abbott 2011: 2). This critique is not unique 
to regime complex theory, but has also been forwarded towards regime theory in general 
(Andonova et al. 2009: 54). Building on James Rosenau´s (2000; for an overview see also 
Rosenau / Czempiel 1992) famous distinction between government and governance it has 
been argued that “[g]lobal governance can (…) take place with and without the state” (Ibid.: 
55)22. It is characterized by the emergence and participation of new actors that have only 
been active at the sub-national level (Biermann / Pattberg 2012: 6). More recently, research 
has also begun to conceptualize institutions and organizations at the international level as 
actors in themselves. An example is the scholarly attention that is being paid to the autonomy 
and authority of international bureaucracies (Bauer et al. 2012: 30; see also Bauer et al. 2009). 
Also, global corporations play important roles in global environmental politics, as they can 
use multiple ways to constructively or obstructively influence the negotiation and 
implementation of international regulation (Tiehaara et al. 2012).  
The distinction between global governance23 with its multiple actors and regime theory with 
its state-centered perspective on political actors are not mutually exclusive though because, 
16 “A regime whose components are compatible and mutually reinforcing is coherent.“ (Keohane / Victor 2011: 16) 
17 “The elements of the regime complex should be accountable to relevant audiences, including not just states but non-governmental organizations and 
publics. (…) Accountability helps create legitimacy (which may be in shorter supply in the absence of a single unified regime) and can also help create shared 
information that lowers uncertainty.“ (Ibid: 17) 
18 “Determinacy is important both to enhance compliance and to reduce uncertainty in general. (…) Where rules are determinate it will be easier for 
governments and firms to invest resources in putting those rules into practice (...)“ (Ibid.) 
19 “Sustainable regimes have components that reinforce one another and may also build in redundancy, to withstand shocks.“ (Ibid.). 
20 “Like comprehensive regimes, regime complexes can vary in epistemic quality, particularly in the consistency between their rules and scientific 
knowledge. Epistemic quality is important for legitimacy as well as effectiveness.“ (Ibid.) 
21 “Since multilateral institutions always reflect disparities of power and interests, they never perfectly reflect abstract normative standards of fairness, 
and should not be evaluated on the basis of whether they achieve this utopian objective. But they should provide benefits widely, and not discriminate against 
states that are willing to cooperate.“ (Ibid.) 
22 Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn have subsumed the concept of global governance in a quite simple (and of course simplified) yet instructive equation: 
“Global Governance = Governance by + Governance with + Governance without Governments“ (2004: 15; italics in original). 
23 Biermann and Pattberg (2012) have argued that there are two basic understandings underlying the academic research towards the concept of Global 
Governance: (1) an analytical understanding that focuses on describing „...distinct qualities of current world politics, such as non-hierarchical steering modes and 
the inclusion of private actors, both for-profit and nonprofit“ (Ibid: 3). (2) A normative understanding “...that starts from a perceived inadequacy of political 
responses to globalization. From this perspective, global governance is first and foremost a political program to regain the necessary steering capacity for problem 
solving in the postmodern age. (…) Global Governance is seen here as a solution, a tool that politicians need to develop and employ to solve the problems that 
globalization has brought about“ (Ibid.). The criticism mentioned above is clearly originating from the analytical understanding. This is however by far not the 
appropriate place to engage in an in-depth discussion of the concept of global governance and its emergence, further arguments and its critics´ positions. 
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 as we have mentioned earlier, “state interests will reflect the interests of the major 
constituencies that exert influence over state leaders” (Keohane / Victor 2010: 3). We thus 
have to keep in mind that negotiation processes are always influenced by non state actors 
(NGOs, civil society, the media) and have to analyze their influence on these processes as long 
as they are operationalizable.  
The issue of regime scholarship focusing on inter-state regimes can also be solved by – as 
Kenneth Abbott (2011) has proposed it – distinguishing between two types of regime theory: 
first, “traditional regime theory” (Ibid.: 16) that focuses on inter-state relations and 
organizational competition, and second, a “broader version of regime complex theory” (Ibid.) 
that also includes non-state actors and questions of polycentrism, fragmentation and 
decentralization. Regime complex theory can thus be seen as an attempt to merge the state-
centered regime theory with the multiple-actors-perspective of global governance. It also 
seems to be worthwhile to include a perspective on transnational regimes which are heavily 
influenced by non-state actors, e.g. the international standards regime (Pattberg 2012: 99). 
We shall later see in the analysis of the regime complex of climate change (chapter 3.2) how 
these perspectives enhance the traditional perspective.  
A more substantial point of criticism regarding regime theory is the argument that a 
multitude of international regulations and their respective arenas (as in a regime complex) 
might overburden developing countries which often lack the ability to build up expertise in 
all of these arenas (Messner / Nuscheler 2003: 10). 
A further point of criticism has been the focus on legally binding regulations and a lack of 
attention towards soft-law (Abbott 2011: 2). As governments have moved away from 
“command and control style regulation” (Tienhaara et al.: 2012: 47) and regulation at the 
international level is lacking accountability mechanisms, the dominating conflict-ridden 
discourse of economy-versus-ecology that dominated during the 1970s and 1980s (Huber 
2011a: 137) has been appeased and new types of partnerships have emerged. Transnational 
(business and non-business) actors play an important role in environmental governance 
(Andonova et al. 2009; Bäckstrand et al. 2012 and Tienhaara et al. 2012), not only since the 
promulgation of so called public-private-partnerships (PPPs) after the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg. Nevertheless, the concept of regime 
complexes as we have outlined it above should be flexible enough to take account of these 
actors, e.g. by acknowledging the important role of experts, lawyers and NGOs due to the 
increasing complexity of the international realm. 
From a perspective derived from critical theories like neo-marxism or feminism one could 
argue that institutionalist theories (like regime complex theory) tend not to pay sufficient 
attention to existing relations of power. Even if we argue from a “broader version on regime 
complex theory” (Abbot 2011: 16) that incorporates non-state actors, this still does not tell us 
anything about the informal structures of society, like lobby-networks, gender relations, the 
representation and participation of minorities in decision-making or the inequality in access 
to information. A prominent example in this case would be the political and financial power 
of large corporations in the USA that exercise large influence on the behavior of the 
government regarding the mitigation of GHG emissions (Lander 2011: 9). Besides the role of 
the lobbyist, global corporations can also be communicators or regulators and thus influence 
the formation of regimes positively or negatively (Tienhaara et al. 2012: 63). 
At this point I shall conclude the theoretical elaborations on regimes and regime complexes 
and we will now shift our attention towards the regime complex that is relevant for this 
analysis: the regime complex for climate change. 
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 3. Climate Change Governance 
 
Climate change is among the most pressing of contemporary global environmental 
problems. It could even be seen as the archetype of a global environmental problem, as it is 
trans-boundary in nature, meaning that causes and effects might not necessarily be located in 
the same country and also do not stop at a state´s border. Furthermore it is a problem that 
can only be addressed by international cooperation, because the reduction of greenhouse 
gases is very much prone to free-riding behavior if it is unregulated. To use Garrett Hardin´s 
famous term, climate change can be described as a “tragedy of the commons” (see Hardin 
1968). The anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases have increased since the industrial 
revolution and have had a measurable impact on the increase in global average temperatures 
that is scientifically well studied and proven (IPCC 2007: 31). The IPCC has subsumed the 
results of its research since 1988: 
 
“There is very high confidence that the global average net effect of human activities since 
1750 has been one of warming.” (Ibid.: 37) 
 
The main drivers of increasing GHG emissions are population growth and GDP growth. 
Building on data from the World Bank´s (2011) World Development Indicators and the 
International Energy Agency (IEA)´s (2011) World Energy Outlook, Ronald B. Mitchell 
estimates that “[b]etween 1996 and 2006, global CO² emissions grew by 2,4% per year. That 
trend was driven by annual per capita GDP growth of 1,8% and annual population growth of 
1,3%, generating aggregate GDP growth of 3,1% that was only partially offset by 
technological improvements that decreased emissions per dollar by 0,7%. (…) In both 
developed and developing countries since 2000 (including during the recent recession), 
production techniques have led to higher emissions per unit of energy at the same time that 
affluence (per capita income) and consumption (energy used per dollar) have increased” 
(2012: 25; brackets and italics in original). 
Climate change poses risks for human life on Earth, like increasing possibilities of extreme 
weather, rising sea-levels, increasing and more severe droughts, health risks, and many more, 
some of which we might not even know about yet due to the complexity of the issue (for an 
overview of the possible consequences see IPCC 2007). It may also affect the development 
dynamics in many poor countries by causing pressure on resources (e.g. rising food prices), 
aggravate destitution, migration, and conflict, or by affecting political stability and 
governance structures (Sterner et al. 2012: 72). Climate change also has the potential to create 
new international conflicts, e.g. by increasing climate-related transnational migration, or 
intensifying existing conflicts as in the case of Darfur (Welzer 2007: 94-99). Also non-human 
life on Earth faces severe challenges as animals and plants have to struggle with rising 
temperatures as well24, the bleaching of corals due to increasing ocean temperature and 
acidification being one of the most famous examples of this (Anthony et al. 2011). All these 
effects are pervasive (Sachs 2011: 5). Climate change is not the one single cause for many of 
these trends (e.g. rising food prices are also influenced by rising oil prices), but as the EU 
24 Unfortunately the issues of climate change and biodiversity are addressed by different international regimes that do refer to each other, but the legal 
linkage of the two remains insufficient as “...existing statutes and laws that deal with biodiversity are not up to the job of slowing climate change to protect the 
species and ecosystems endangered by global warming. Conversely, climate change law, although motivated in part by biodiversity and ecosystem concerns, does 
no incorporate biodiversity in shaping adaptation and mitigation regulations.“ (Hodas 2005: 6) 
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 Commissioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard put it: “It is a threat multiplier.” (2011: 
70). 
 
3.1. Historical Development 
 
I shall first give an overview of the historical development of the regime complex for climate 
change, before I will turn the attention towards the contemporary structure of this complex. 
Building on Daniel Bodansky´s (2010) argument of a three stage process of climate change 
regime formation, the historical dimension shall be analyzed as being divided into three 
different stages: the establishment of a basic framework for action, the Kyoto phase and the 
post-Kyoto phase. 
 
3.1.1. Establishing a Basic Framework for Action 
 
Building on the concept of political leadership25, Steinar Andresen and Shardul Agrawala 
(2002) have argued that states were not the only important actors in the formation of the 
climate regime. Especially during the early phases of the formation process (agenda-setting 
phase), there was much room for intellectual leadership by individuals and non state actors 
(Ibid.). “An intellectual leader is an individual who produces intellectual capital or generative 
systems of thought that shape the perspectives of those who participate in institutional 
bargaining and, in so doing, plays an important role in determining the success or failure of 
efforts to reach agreement on the terms of constitutional contracts in international society” 
(Young 1991: 298). 
The agenda setting period of the regime formation process can be traced back surprisingly 
far: during the 1950s Roger Revelle and Hans Suess, two oceanographers, analyzed the 
oceanic uptake of radioactive carbon that had been released during the atmospheric testing 
of nuclear weapons (Andresen / Agrawala 2002: 43). Their results led them to the conclusion 
that anthropogenic emissions of large amounts of carbon will have strong effects on the 
global climate and the weather (Ibid.). 
The discussion remained confined to certain epistemic communities and arenas like the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the International Council of Scientific Unions 
(ICSU) (Ibid.). It did not gain much public attention during the 1960s and 1970s, part of which 
might be attributed to the global public sphere being occupied with the East-West-Conflict 
and consequences of climate change like increasing severity of weather extremes not yet 
being visible or discursively linked to climate change. By the mid 1980s a crucial figure in the 
formation of the climate regime emerged: Mostafa Tolba, at that point executive director of 
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), played an important role – together with 
his organization26 – by deciding to use UNEP funds to sponsor an international assessment 
by the International Meteorological Institute (IMI) (Ibid.). 
25 Leadership can be defined as “the power of one or a few individuals to induce a group to adopt a particular line of policy“ (Andresen / Agrawala 2002: 
41). It should be noted though, that leadership is not necessarily confined to individuals or small groups. During international negotiations individuals can assert 
individual leadership, but they can also be acting on behalf of governments and thus simply be agents of these.  
26 UNEP has been characterized as a very important agenda setter in global environmental governance: “In spite of its rather marginal status within the 
United Nations System and its peripheral location in Nairobi, UNEP has developed the capacity to act as the foremost knowledge broker of environmental 
governance at the international level“ (Bauer et al. 2012: 33). 
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 The results of this assessment were presented in 1985 in Villach, Austria, and gave a strong 
impetus on international climate politics in general and more specific on the 1988 Toronto 
Conference of the Atmosphere that marked the “high water mark of the influence [of] 
environmental advocacy groups” (Ibid: 44). One of the central results of the conference was 
the establishment of the IPCC by UNEP and WMO about six months later in November 1988 
(Ibid.). 
As mentioned earlier, the IPCC was established in order to give the international community 
scientific advice. It is thus an example of how complexity creates an increasing need for and 
reliance on experts. The IPCC produces regular Assessment Reports to fulfill its duty and has 
so far produced four of these reports27. A key feature of the IPCC´s reports is their political 
negotiation28, which has been argued to increase the legitimacy and scientific credibility of 
the highly conflictual climate governance (Gupta et al. 2012: 86). The first of these reports 
played an important role in highlighting the importance of the issue and bringing national 
governments to the negotiating table for a global climate convention. It thus marks the end 
of the agenda-setting stage of the regime formation process and the beginning of the 
negotiation stage (Andresen / Agrawala 2002: 45). As scientific knowledge about the 
anthropogenic effects of climate change improved, this has been highlighted by the reports. 
Nevertheless, the overall influence of the IPCC on the formation of the climate regime after 
the agenda-setting phase has been limited, due to its consensus-based working structure 
(Gupta et al. 2012: 86). The Fourth Assessment Report concluded that “[w]arming of the 
climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global 
average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global 
average sea level” (IPCC 2007: 72). Furthermore, “[m]ost of the global average warming over 
the past 50 years is very likely due to anthropogenic GHG increases and it is likely that there is 
a discernible human-induced warming averaged over each continent (except Antarctica)” 
(Ibid.; italics in original). The validity of these results has repeatedly been questioned by so 
called climate sceptics. A close analysis of these criticisms reveals most of them29 to be 
campaigns by business-funded right wing think tanks (Harrison 2010a: 69) or associations like 
the Global Climate Coalition (see Newell 2000 and Paterson 2009), a now closed group of 
(mainly US) companies opposing binding or direct action towards the reduction of GHGs.  
In response to the IPCC´s First Assessment Report, governments created an International 
Negotiating Committee (INC) with the mandate to negotiate an international framework for 
climate change governance (Andresen / Agrawala 2002: 45). During the negotiation stage of 
the UN´s legal regime on climate change leading up to the 1992 United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) the USA, Japan and Russia proved to be the 
biggest laggards, aiming for non-binding reduction targets and taking a much more 
proactive stance than during the negotiations of the ozone regime30 (Bodansky 2011a: 6; 
Andresen / Agrawala 2002). In the USA this was exacerbated by fears from US corporations 
27 So far reports have been published in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007. The Fifth Assessment Report is expected to be published in 2013 or 2014. The Reports 
can be accessed on the IPCC´s website alongside a number of specialized reports dealing with topics like aviation or Land-use, Land-use change and Forestry 
(LULUCF): http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#.T66UQcUnaSp (last accessed: 12.5.2012) 
28 “[T]he official interaction between scientists and policy makers is restricted to well-defined stages of the assessment. Scientists of the IPCC bureau first 
develop an outline of an IPCC report and identify topics of the working groups and the division of labor. They suggest this to national governments and select the 
authors and reviewers based on their scientific expertise and issues of geographical representation. The subsequent redrafting of chapters and the first round of 
peer reviews is undertaken by scientists. Governments enter the process once again in the second round of the review process, when their comments on revised 
assessment drafts are solicited. Finally, they have a crucial role in the approval of the summary for policy makers and the synthesis report“ (Gupta et al. 2012: 74).  
29 There are some notable exceptions, one of them being the Danish writer and academic Björn Lomborg (see Lomborg 2001) who has been a strong 
opponent of the Kyoto Protocol. He argues from an utilitarian and anthropocentric perspective, claiming that mitigation of climate change is rather cost-ineffective 
compared with other adaptation measures. He also argues that there are other problems like HIV, poverty and democratization which he deems more urgent and 
consequently argues that humanity should invest in mitigating these rather than mitigating climate change. It should be noted though that Lomborg unlike the 
above mentioned climate sceptics does not challenge the existence of global warming or the anthropogenic dimension of it. 
30 It has been argued that the proactive role of the USA during the negotiations was due to an “ozone recoil“ (Andresen / Agrawala 2002: 43) as the USA 
were behaving rather reactively during the Montral Protocol´s negotiating stage and thus had missed the chance to prevent any binding commitments by the 
member states.  
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 that an ambitious climate agreement would have them loose market shares to the newly 
consolidated EU and to Asia (Kimble 2011: 20). On the other hand the EU and some of its 
member states took a self-proclaimed leadership role and aimed for binding reduction 
commitments (Andresen / Agrawala 2002: 45 and more general Schreurs / Tiberghien 2010). 
Even though states were the main actors during this negotiation phase, non-state actors still 
asserted influence on states through lobbying. Especially business associations like the 
European Round-Table of Industrialists, UNICE and the Global Climate Coalition used their 
well-established ties to the political system in order to influence the regime formation 
towards their advantage (Levy / Newell 2000). Weaker actors in terms of resources like 
environmental NGOs were less important during this phase. Nevertheless, non-business-
NGOs were able to exert some influence on the evolution of the climate regime as well, for 
example by mobilizing the insurance sector to speak out in favor of action towards climate 
change and thus fracturing the economic actors (Levy / Newell 2002: 96).  
The USA´s efforts were eventually successful and the final treaty, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)31, which was negotiated in New York 
in 1992 and signed at UNCED did not contain any binding reduction targets. Unlike the Kyoto 
Protocol a few years later, it was signed and ratified by the USA. 
International treaties can be analyzed according to the freedom that they give the individual 
states in their action. There are two ideal types to be differentiated: top-down approaches32 
defining certain policies, goals and measures that states have to implement, and bottom-up 
approaches33 that contain less specific commitments and goals and thus give the states 
more freedom in choosing the concrete measures and policies they will pursue (Bodansky 
2011a: 4). 
A notable influence on the UNFCCC had been the – due to it being perceived as one of the 
most successful treaties in international environmental policy making (Tienhaara et al. 2012: 
50) – Montreal Protocol34 with its top-down approach (Bodanksy 2011a: 5). Due to the strong 
opposition from the above mentioned countries, the battle between proponents of bottom-
up versus top-down approaches continued until shortly before UNCED. Eventually, a 
compromise was found essentially containing both approaches (Ibid.: 5): 
Article 4.1. of the UNFCCC contains a bottom-up approach. It calls on the convention´s 
member states to develop national and/or regional programs in order to mitigate their 
emissions of those GHGs that are not covered by the Montreal Protocol and in order to adapt 
to climate change. It also calls for further efforts to coordinate actions and cooperate towards 
these goals and also calls for regular reportingon the progress to the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC. It is also worth mentioning, that non-governmental 
organizations are mentioned as partners for states where feasible, a fact that is noteworthy, as 
this was a novelty in international politics first introduced at UNCED (Clemencon 2012: 6). 
31 Available online at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (last accessed: 12.5.2012) 
32 The Convention on International Trade in Endagered Species (CITES) is an example of a top-down approach as it defines species that are in need of 
protection as well as how they are supposed to be protected (by permitting exports and imports of these species). (Bodansky 2011a: 4). 
33 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitats (RAMSAR convention) is an example for a bottom-up approach 
that encourages countries to protect wetlands. Still there are no clear specifications on how this protection is to be achieved and member states are relatively free 
to decide which measures best suit their respective cases. Another example is the G-20´s initiative to reduce fossil fuel subsidies that was started in 2009, and has 
since then developed into a bottom-up-approach which will be nationally led rather than being based on collectively agreed targets with specific timetables 
(Runnals 2011: 8). 
34 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer (a protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer) 
established fixed timetables for the phasing-out of Chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) and Hydrochloroflourocarbons (HCFCs), substances that are primarily responsible for 
the depletion of the ozone layer. The protocol´s legal text is available online: 
http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MP_Handbook/Section_1.1_The_Montreal_Protocol/ (last accessed: 13.5.2012) 
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 Article 4.2. on the other hand contains a top-down approach. It formulates the “aim”35 for 
those countries listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC (developed and transition countries of the 
former soviet block) to reduce their emissions to the levels of 1990. Furthermore, Article 4.2(f) 
also contains the two main approaches that are applied towards tackling climate change on 
the international level: mitigation and adaptation36. 
The differentiation between developed and transitioning countries on the one hand and 
developing countries on the other hand has remained at the core of international climate 
governance and can easily be identified as the central “barrier for an effective climate policy” 
(Streck 2012: 53). “[T]he prevalent neglect of global justice issues” (Davy / Pellissery 2011: 106) 
is tied to this problem as a “policy, even if environmentally effective and economically 
efficient, must fail as long as too many stakeholders perceive this policy as fundamentally 
unjust” (Ibid: 106-107). The UNFCCC has also been criticized for further complicating 
negotiations as many climate-related discussions would not necessarily require the 
participation of all signatory parties (Michonski / Levi 2010: 1).  
The debate about top-down versus bottom-up approaches has since the beginning been at 
the core of the development of the climate regime (Ibid.: 6) and can still be observed today in 
the process leading to a post-Kyoto agreement. The debate centers around the argument 
that the lack of an international coordinator and the relatively young age of most 
international environmental institutions should be translated into “learning by doing” rather 
than focusing on coordination (Andresen 2002: 23). 
Nevertheless, the UNFCCC established a “basic system of governance” (Bodansky 2011b: 2) for 
the issue-area of climate change. The main actors in the UNFCCC are its member states. The 
convention´s secretariat has since the beginning been limited to providing knowledge and 
technical support as well as exercising bureaucratic authority, rather than being able to 
provide any factual leadership during the negotiations (Bauer et. al 2009: 176-180). The 
UNFCCC´s governance system basically consists of three pillars: “the formulation of ambitions 
and goals, definition of frameworks that account for greenhouse gas emissions and 
reductions, and the organization of international transfer of finance supporting developing 
countries in their mitigation and adaptation efforts” (Streck 2012: 53). In its preamble the 
UNFCCC also refers to the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility. This is one 
of the core normatives37 of international sustainable development governance set forth in 
the Rio-Declaration38 (more specifically principle 7) presented after UNCED (Bernstein / 
Brunnée 2011: 7). It is central for the evolution of the international climate regime and global 
environmental governance in general, as developing countries often refer to it when rejecting 
binding commitments for themselves. 
After the creation of UNFCCC there was now a need to specify the commitments of Article 4.2. 
(the first pillar) into quantitative emission limitation and reduction objectives (QUELROs) in 
order to establish concrete goals, measure progress and achieve accountability. Ultimately, 
this was what the Kyoto Protocol39 would specify. 
 
35 It is has been highlighted, that the term “aim“ is weaker than the term “goal“ and it has also been stressed that the use of this terminology can be seen 
as an attempt to weaken the UNFCCC (Bodansky / Diringer 2011: 8).  
36 Thom Brooks has published an interesting paper (2012) concerning these approaches: he argues that neither of the two approaches is satisfactory in 
itself as both of them offer end-state-solutions that might not be able to take into account all future events completely. Even though he dismisses both strategies 
as unsatisfactory he does not end up with cynicism but instead sees an unspecified change of humanity as the solution. 
37 The other normatives are: state sovereignty over natural resources and the responsibility of states to make sure that activities within their jurisdiction do 
not cause damage to the environment in other states (Rio Principle 2), the Precautionary Principle (Rio principle 15), the Polluter Pays Principle (Rio Principle 16), 
and the right of individuals to have access to information regarding environmental affairs, participation and justice (Rio Principle 10) (Bernstein / Brunnée 2011: 7). 
38 The legal text of the Rio Declaration can be found here: http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 
(last accessed 13.5.2012) 
39 The Kyoto Protocol´s legal text is available online: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf (last accessed: 13.5.2012) 
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3.1.2. The Kyoto Protocol 
 
The negotiating process for the Kyoto Protocol was initiated at the UNFCCC COP-1 in Berlin in 
1995. Negotiators had come to Berlin in order to negotiate QUELROs for the Annex I countries 
of the UNFCCC (Bodansky 2011a: 7). As these would only be relevant to the developed and 
transitioning countries, the main lines of conflict were between the European Community on 
the one side and the USA with support from Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the 
so-called JUSCANZ40 or ´umbrella´41 group (Bodansky 2011b: 3), on the other side. Conflict 
arose regarding the type of approach to be applied and the mechanisms to be included. 
Negotiations continued at COP-2 in Geneva in 1996 and up until COP-3 in Kyoto when a final 
compromise was achieved that reflected all parties´ interests42: 
 
“The EU got their numbers, the US got their institutions, Japan got prestige as a host, the 
JUSCANZ countries got their differentiation and the developing countries avoided 
commitments” (Andresen 1998: 28) 
The Kyoto Protocol specified two issues: first, the types of GHGs43 and the sectors and 
sources44 that would account for reductions (Annex A), and second, the percentage by which 
the developing and transitioning countries had to reduce their output of these gases during 
the Kyoto Protocol´s first commitment period (2008-2012) compared to the base year of 1990 
(Annex B). As said before, there were no reduction commitments for developing countries. 
Australia, Iceland and Norway were the only countries allowed to slightly increase their 
emissions whereas Russia, New Zealand and the Ukraine committed themselves to stabilizing 
emissions on their 1990 levels. The major emitters committed themselves to reductions of -
7% (USA) and -6% (Japan, Canada45), while the European Union redistributed its collective 
reduction goal of -8% among its members, an approach that is called burden sharing. 
According to article 3.2 as of 2005, each Annex I country has to “have made demonstrable 
progress in achieving its commitments”. In retrospective those countries with very ambitious 
reduction commitments and those with not very ambitious commitments did not achieve 
their goals (Jänicke 2011:142-143). Germany and Great-Britain were most successful in 
meeting their commitments, even though both were aided by changes in the structure of the 
energy sector (the breakdown of the soviet-style economy in the case of the German 
40 Sometimes also called JUSSCANNZ to include Norway and Switzerland.  
41 The ´umbrella´ group also contains Russia and the Ukraine. 
42 For a detailed account of the negotiation process see Andresen 1998 and Andresen / Agrawala 2002. 
43 These are Carbon Dioxide (which in the form of CO²-Equivalents also serves as the reference base for the other gases), Methane, Nitrous Oxide and 
Sulfuraflouride as well as the groups of Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and Perfluorocarbons (PFCs). At the 17th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Durban in December 2011 a proposal by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I 
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWP-KP) was decided on that also adds Nitrogen Triflouride to the list of greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/awgkp_outcome.pdf (last accessed April 25th 2012) 
44 These are the Energy Sector (Fuel combustion and fugitive emissions from fuels), industrial processes (mineral products, chemical industry, metal 
production, other production, production of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, and other sources), 
solvent and other product use, agriculture (enteric fermentation, manure management, rice cultivation, agricultural soils, prescribed burning of savannas, field 
burning of agricultural residues, and other sources), and waste (solid waste disposal on land, wastewater handling, waste incineration and other sources). 
45 It has been argued that Canada has likely accepted the most ambitious reduction targets. Although not formally the most ambitious, the structure of the 
Canadian economy meant that “in order to comply [Canadian Policymakers] knew they would need to deliver a 30 percent reduction below projected emissions by 
2010“ (Harrison 2010b: 169). A serious problem preventing ambitious action in this field have been the strong ties between the USA´s and Canada´s economies 
together with the USA´s reluctance to ratify which was seen in Canada as creating economic disadvantages (Ibid: 194). Canada has ever since the Kyoto Protocol´s 
entry into force failed to fulfill its Kyoto commitments and eventually retreated from the Kyoto Protocol in December 2012 right after the UNFCCC´s COP-17 in 
Durban and the decision taken there, to create a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. 
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 unification and a shift from heavy reliance on coal towards gas in the British example) 
(Schreurs / Tiberghien 2010: 47-52; see also Jänicke 2011: 144).  
The specific rules for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol though were only set out in the 
Marrakesh Accords46 agreed upon at the UNFCCC´s COP-7 in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2001 
(Osterheld 2010: 28).   
The assignment of fixed reduction targets is nothing marginal: it has strong influence on the 
global political economy as it creates rights of ownership and use of the atmosphere, 
preventing it from being used as a free dumping ground for GHGs (Edenhofer 2011: 204-205). 
It can be seen as an attempt to solve the tragedy of the commons and regulate the use of the 
global commons ´atmosphere´. 
The Kyoto Protocol furthermore sets out the rules and obligations for establishing reporting 
and registration structures at the national and international level, as well as the establishment 
of compliance structures at the international level (most notably the Compliance Committee) 
(see Osterheld 2010 for a detailed analysis of these structures). 
The Kyoto Protocol was open for signature as of March 16th, 1998 for the time of one year 
(Article 24). The Kyoto Protocol´s Article 25 specified that it would enter into force a) once 55 
member countries of the UNFCCC had ratified it and b) these 55 countries included Annex I-
countries that collectively accounted for at least 55% of global Annex I-country GHG 
emissions. The first goal was achieved in May 2002 with the ratification of Iceland (Osterheld 
2010: 28). The second condition proved to be harder to fulfill, as the US Senate had passed the 
Byrd-Hagel-Resolution47 in 1997 – prior to the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol – which 
effectively prevented the USA (which accounted for 36,1% of global emissions in 1990) from 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. It was thus Russia´s (accounting for about 18% of the 1990 
emissions; Ibid.) ratification that was needed for the Kyoto Protocol to become effective. 
Russia had strategically waited with its ratification in order to gain as much side-payments as 
possible and it was the EU´s support for Russia´s accession to the WTO that finally tipped the 
scales (Henry / McIntosh Sundstrom 2010: 116)48.  
An important aspect of the Kyoto Protocol are the so called Flexible Mechanisms (sometimes 
also called Kyoto Mechanisms). These are mechanisms that were implemented in order to 
support the states in Annex B in their efforts towards the reduction of GHGs. They are market-
based mechanisms that can be interpreted as historical symptoms of the unreflected faith in 
the power of free markets and capitalism more generally that prevailed after the fall of the 
iron curtain. On the other hand, the argument has been brought forward by Peter Newell and 
Matthew Paterson (2010: 7) – certainly not famous for being advocates of unregulated 
capitalism – that market-based approaches might be the only feasible way for societies to 
collectively combat anthropogenic climate change. The USA were the main proponent of the 
46 The “Marrakesch Accords & the Marrakesch Declaration“ can be accessed online: http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf (last accessed 
17.5.2012) 
47 Named after its initiators, senators Robert Byrd (Democrat) and Chuck Hagel (Republican) and supported by the Global Climate Coalition (Paterson 2009 
and Harrison 2010a), the resolution gave the justification of the ecological unilateralism the USA would pursue ever after and especially during the two 
presidential terms of George W. Bush. Together with China´s reluctance to agree to any commitments for developing countries under a post-Kyoto agreement 
(Heggelund et al. 2010) it has also for years effectively blocked progress in the negotiations for a global climate agreement following the Kyoto Protocol. It states 
that “...the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would-- 
  (A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless  the protocol or other 
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce  greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same 
compliance period, or 
 
  (B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States...“ (US Senat 1997) 
48 Russia eventually completed its accession process to WTO in November 2011. Interestingly this was a few weeks before the UNFCCC´s COP-17 in Durban. 
As this was one of the last chances to set the stage for a post-Kyoto agreement, it seems possible that diplomatic pressure to finish the process was induced upon 
the WTO´s Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO in order to get Russia´s support during the negotiations. 
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 inclusion of the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol  and these were partly based on 
the USA´s experiences with implementing the Clean Air Act of 1990 which required a 
reduction of the sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired electric power plants of about 50% 
(Dernbach / Kakade 2008: 10-11). 
The Flexible Mechanisms were designed to allow the Annex B countries to trade in emission 
allowances (emissions trading - Article 17) (see Lohmann 2006 for a critical account), 
collectively implement projects to reduce GHG emissions (joint implementation – Article 6) 
and to get credit for reductions achieved in developing countries where it might be cheaper 
to achieve reductions than in developed countries (clean development mechanism – Article 
12) (Paterson 2009: 143). The implementation of emissions trading had been a necessary 
condition for the USA to agree to the Kyoto Protocol, so the EU – even though they opposed 
the concept – eventually gave in, in order to reach any agreement at all (Santarius / Braun 
2008: 24). Still the EU managed to implement in Article 17 the notion that these measures are 
only supposed to be supplemental to domestic efforts, but they failed to include a further 
definition of supplementality (Sterk / Arens 2008: 42). The intention behind this was to 
prevent states from not actively reducing and instead only buying emissions allowances from 
other countries. 
The Kyoto Protocol and its Flexible Mechanisms have also been criticized though. An 
important point of criticism is the focus on the output-dimension of the ´brown economy´ 
whereas the input-dimension is still dominated by nation states and transnational 
corporations (Brunnengräber 2011: 34). There is also no further specification of the role that 
forests could play even though they could create important contributions as carbon sinks 
(Simonis 2007). Other points of criticism have been the insecurities in determining actual 
reductions, the substitution of emissions reductions with other GHGs not covered by the 
Kyoto Protocol, insufficient accountability and difficulties in determining the additionality and 
sustainability of CDM and JI projects (Brunnengräber 2011: 33). 
Perhaps the most important critique has been that the market mechanisms do not – contrary 
to the claims of their proponents – reduce transaction costs and regulatory burdens, but 
rather create large bureaucracies which are often overburdened with the governance of these 
complex issues (Newell 2012: 41-42):  
“For the governance of market mechanisms to be effective and legitimate, attention needs to 
be paid to aspects of “good” governance: transparency of flows; measures for identifying and 
dealing with evidence of collusion and corruption between a limited range of actors with the 
necessary expertise and skills; and adequate systems of participation, representation, and 
accountability, especially to actors invoked as the beneficiaries of projects and partnerships” 
(Ibid.: 42; brackets in original). 
Before we continue with the analysis of the evolution of the international climate regime, it 
makes sense to have a more in depth look at the three flexible mechanisms as their 
understanding is not a sufficient, but still a necessary condition for the understanding of the 
functioning of the climate change regime complex. 
 
3.1.2.1. Emissions Trading 
 
If we study different systems of emissions trading schemes (ETS) it is important to pay 
attention to one crucial question: who is actually trading? The ETS of the Kyoto Protocol for 
example is an interstate system that has states as the trading partners whereas the European 
30 
 Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) is designed to be a transnational market for 
companies to trade emissions allowances. In this sense there is not one but multiple ETS that 
exist on different levels (Santarius / Braun 2008: 22). 
The basic idea is always the same though: a certain level (cap) of allowed emissions for a 
specified time is fixed for each trading partner and is then quantified in the form of so called 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) that can be traded. This system is often referred to as cap-and-
trade. Usually, the amount of AAUs is reduced during each assignment period in order to 
create incentives for continuing reduction and innovation (Schüle 2008). A second goal is to 
allocate efforts to reduce emissions to those place where it is cheapest and most effective, 
building on the – not unquestioned (see Cassidy 2010) -  premise that markets are the most 
efficient way to allocate resources (Edenhofer et al. 2011). As a side-effect, emissions trading 
can support the transition of a country´s energy sector towards renewable energies even 
though this process depends on a certain price level to create the necessary incentives 
(Fischedick 2008). 
In the case of the inter-state ETS the states have to implement their specific reductions and 
have to develop mechanisms for the allocation and subsequent trading of emissions 
allowances at the national level, i.e. they have to create the same mechanisms existing on the 
international level on a national scale, only this time for companies49. Supervised by the 
UNFCCC secretariat, states can distribute AAUs to companies emitting GHGs allowing them to 
emit a certain amount. This raises the costs of production for the company and thus creates 
incentives to reduce their emissions, e.g. by installing filters or innovating production 
techniques. 
Apart from AAUs the emissions trading scheme set put in the Kyoto Protocol also allows for 
the trading of other types of certificates, namely Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) from 
the Clean Development Mechanism, Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from Joint 
Implementation projects (see chapter 3.1.2.2 for a more thorough description), and Removal 
Units (RMUs) that have been derived from the mechanism of Land use, Land-use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF)50 (Osterheld 2010: 36).  
Ironically even though the EU initially opposed the inclusion of emissions trading into the 
Kyoto Protocol´s Flexible Mechanisms, at the point of writing this paper the only binding and 
sanctionable ETS is the EU-ETS. Its legal base is in the directive 2003/87/EC (EC 2003). It is a 
sectoral steering instrument covering installations emitting GHGs in certain sectors (energy, 
metal processing, iron processing, cement production, pulp and paper production) (Schüle 
2008). As of January 2012 the aviation sector is covered as well (EC 2008a). Even though the 
directive explicitly refers to all the GHGs covered in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol, it still only 
covers carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and PFCs at the current stage. A further extension to 
other sectors and GHGs is planned for the EU-ETS´s third trading period starting in 2013 (EC 
2010).  
The 2003 directive basically presents the legal frame for the national systems being 
developed by the member states. With the help of National Allocation Plans (NAPs) being 
developed at EU-Level, the individual states´ reduction commitments can be broken down for 
several sectors in a first step and then for individual installations in a second step (Schüle 
2008: 11).  
49 There have also been proposals to introduce personal trading schemes that would incorporate individuals in a similar system (see for example Hillmann 
/ Fawcett 2007 or Barrett 1995).  
50 Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol states that the uptake of carbon from the atmosphere as well as the decreases or increases of emissions through certain 
activities (namely afforestation, reforestation and deforestation) are to be taken into account when determining the UNFCCC Annex I-countries´ GHG balance. 
Article 3.4. of the Kyoto Protocol also allows for the inclusion of other activities like forest management, cropland management, grazing land management and 
revegitation to be included in a country´s balance.  
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 So far, the EU-ETS has seen two trading periods (2005-2007 and 2008-2012), the first of which 
was seen as a test phase. During this phase all the emissions allowances – the so called 
European Union Allowances (EUAs), the EU´s Version of AAUs – were given away for free51 
based on the principle of grandfathering that is the accounting of the installations historical 
emissions plus the consideration of the countries reduction commitments. “The price of 
carbon allowances is determined by the market price settled daily by participants in a 
financial market specifically for carbon emission allowances” (Knight 2010: 2). These markets 
are, among others, located in London, Leipzig, Oslo and Paris, although the professional 
expertise in these fields is situated in New York and London which “reflects the way in which 
the carbon market has emerged in complementarity with conventional capital markets” (Ibid: 
3). This development can also be seen in the creation of financial market products specifically 
designed in reaction to the emergence of ETS: carbon (investment) funds, voluntary 
emissions compensation schemes, project financing and special insurances have developed 
alongside financial and administrative services often fulfilled by third actors (Busch et al. 2008: 
158-161). 
If we look at the trading volume, the European Climate Exchange (ECX) in London has clearly 
become a focal point for carbon trading “with existing financial institutions opening trading 
desks specifically to profit from emerging and existing carbon markets” (Bumpus / Livermann 
2008: 143). 
One problem with the principle of grandfathering had been an over-allocation of allowances 
in Germany and other countries due to incorporation of sectors that were not supposed to be 
covered by the EU-ETS, and which led to a massive decline in prices for EUAs by the spring of 
2007, plummeting down to 20 to 30 Eurocent per ton of carbon dioxide (Schüle 2008: 14). A 
second reason for this decline is certainly the fact that allowances from the first phase were 
not allowed to be carried over to the second phase. 
After these experiences, the European Commission acted much more proactively upon the 
crafting of the NAPs for the second allocation period in order to reach stronger reductions 
and also by changing the allocation mode for some states: in Germany, for example, 
grandfathering was replaced by a benchmarking system that does not orient itself on the past 
emission but rather towards the current level of technology (Ibid.). The revision of the EU 
directive on emissions trading (EC 2008a) stated that starting with the third allocation period 
(starting 2013) at least half of the emissions allowances shall be auctioned. The revision was 
not only the result of a changed position within the European Commission, but can also be 
attributed to changed position within the individual member states as well as growing 
support from environmental NGOs and industry associations (Skjærseth / Wettestad 2010: 
119). It has also been interpreted as an attempt to influence the gridlocked international 
climate negotiations (Ibid.). 
However, the future of the type of mandatory emissions trading as practiced by the EU-ETS 
will depend on the future of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. I will later argue that in 
Durban at the UNFCCC´s COP-17 the international community agreed to a slight change in 
scope for the international climate regime: away from the Kyoto Protocol´s top-down 
approach towards a bottom-up approach as of 2020. As emissions trading only makes sense 
in the presence of fixed reductions commitments, it remains to be seen whether there is a 
future for emissions trading in the current form. Another option would be to trade emissions 
51 Technically, there was the opportunity to auction 5% of the allowances, but that was in reality not used by the major economies. 
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 based on non-binding commitments at the regional level (e.g. the EU), the national level52 or 
the sub-state level53. 
Furthermore, the introduction of an international ETS will also depend on whether and how 
the developing countries will be incorporated in a future agreement. As this remains unclear 
at the moment, it seems unsure whether the EU´s proposal at the Kopenhagen-COP to 
establish an OECD-wide ETS based on the EU ETS (Skjærseth / Wettestad 2010: 118) has a 
future. Also, the question remains, whether it will be possible to link all the different ETS that 
exist and are evolving in the long run into a single comprehensive system. Schüle et al. (2008) 
have developed an analytical framework to answer this question and have concluded that 
this seems rather unlikely, as there are crucial differences that prevent a linkage of these 
systems into a single comprehensive mechanism. Eric Knight (2010) has also highlighted the 
importance of economic geography and factors like market structures (e.g. in the energy 
sector) or the importance of time (investment security) for the future development of 
emissions trading. 
 
3.1.2.2. Joint Implemetation and CDM 
 
Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are the two project-
based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (Sterk / Arens 2008: 38). The basic idea is to have 
project developers in developing countries to create and implement projects that reduce 
emissions in other Annex B countries (JI) or in developing countries (CDM) who would 
otherwise not be obliged to reduce just by themselves. The reduced emissions will then be 
credited to the implementing companies who can use them in their national ETS, either to 
cover their own reduction requirements or to sell them on the market. In the case of JI-
projects this will be done as ERUs and in the case of CDM-projects as CERs. 
The implementation of these projects is quite similar in both cases: according to a so-called 
baseline-scenario (which is basically ´business as usual´), the project developers develop a 
project that mitigates the emission of GHGs or takes carbon from the atmosphere and stores 
it (so called carbon sinks), e.g. in the form of afforestation projects. The respective national 
authorities that have been created for this purpose54 evaluate the project and then accredit 
the respective certificates (see Sterk / Arens 2008 for a more detailed description). An 
important factor to be considered and to be proven by the project designers is the 
additionality of the project: they have to prove that the reductions would not happen without 
the investment in the project because otherwise the projects would lead to an increase of the 
available amount of certificates in the industrialized countries (Brunnengräber 2011: 32). 
Apart from the very similar mechanisms, there is one important difference: whereas JI´s 
purpose is to support Annex B-countries in fulfilling their commitments, the CDM also has the 
additional purpose55 of supporting developing countries´ efforts towards sustainable 
development (Piepenbrink 2011: 23; for sustainable development see chapter 4.1.3). 
Up to now, the CDM-projects by far outweigh the JI-projects in numbers: at the time of 
writing this paper (May 2012), there are 4099 registered CDM-projects compared to 343 JI-
52 Examples are the already existing voluntary Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) or the still to be implemented Clean Energy Bill of 2011 that proposed an 
emissions trading scheme for all of Australia.  
53 A notable example is the mandatory emissions trading scheme that has been introduced in the Japanese prefecture of Tokio in 2011. In the USA 
California introduced a cap-and-trade system and several north-eastern states joined in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) (see Paterson 2009: 144). 
54 In the case of the CDM, these are called Designated National Authorities (DNAs) and in the case of JI they are called Accredited Independent Entities 
(AIEs). For an overview of the processes for accepting projects see Osterheld 2011: 31-35. 
55 Noted in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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 projects56. If one compares the quantified reductions achieved by CDM and JI, there is still an 
overbalance of the CDM which created 1.094 Mio CERs between 2008 and 2012, whereas JI 
created 737 Mio. ERUs during the same time (Fenhenn 2012). Of the latter only 0,6% where 
produced outside of Eastern Europe and three quarters of the ERUs came from Russia and the 
Ukraine (Ibid.). During the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the latter two had been strong 
proponents of the 1990 base year for GHG reductions, as the fall of the iron curtain and the 
subsequent collapse of the economies in the former soviet countries had made them likely 
beneficiaries of JI (Henry / McIntosh Sundstrom 2010: 108). 
The regional distribution of the projects has been a point of criticism as well, as three quarters 
of all CDM-projects are located in China, India, Brazil and Mexico (Sterk / Arens 2008). This 
critique can be weakened to some extent, if one considers that Africa´s share of the global 
CO²-emissions was only 3,3% in 2004 (Kifle 2008:5) and that especially those large emerging 
nations have a high potential for cutting emissions in the case of envisaged investments. 
Additionally, the market orientation of the CDM causes funding often to be directed to 
countries with higher processing capacities (usually those with more experience in 
implementing these projects) and better accessible markets (e.g. China) (Newell et al. 2009: 
12-13). 
The lack of focus on the sustainable development goal of the CDM has also been criticized 
(Piepenbrink 2011: 25). There is so far no comprehensive assessment of the long term 
sustainable development effects of CDM-projects, but studies analyzing project documents 
concluded that about half the projects lack any reference to sustainability at all (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, a lack of stakeholder participation often leads to negative outcomes in the 
social dimension (Ibid.: 26). 
Another point of criticism directed towards the CDM is more severe: about two thirds of CERs 
are produced by projects designed to reduce the emissions of HFCs, methane and nitrous 
oxide. Initially this seems plausible, as the effect these gases have on the climate is much 
stronger than that of carbon dioxide (methane is a 21x and HFCs are on average even 11.700x 
times stronger GHGs than carbon dioxide) (Sterk / Arens 2008: 39). The problem though is 
that these gases are often the byproducts of other production processes and can relatively 
easily be separated and burned. This leads to about a third of CDM-projects in China, India 
and Brazil being so-called end-of-pipe-projects that separate these gases and then burn them 
(Brunnengräber 2011: 32). This can be done quite cheaply (in the case of HFC-23 about 0,50 $ 
per ton of CO²-equivalents), but does not really contribute to a sustainable development in 
the sense of reducing poverty or providing basic services to the population (Sterk / Arens 
2008: 40). A possible solution would be the creation of mechanisms that systematically secure 
the sustainability of these projects and secure the creation of co-benefits (Arens et al. 2007; 
Newell et al. 2009; Newell 2012 and Piepenbrink 2011: 27). 
The Kyoto Protocol and its flexible mechanisms were an important step in global climate 
governance and the development of the regime complex of climate change. Nevertheless it 
had its flaws and criticism has been uttered since the beginning. Two important points of 
criticism are worth mentioning: first, the Kyoto Protocol is not comprehensive enough to 
ensure an effective protection of the global climate system. Those states that are willing to 
implement reduction commitments only account for 25% of global emissions (Bodansky 
2011a: 8). As I have already mentioned, there are no reduction commitments for developing 
countries and thus there are no incentives for them to reduce emissions (besides attracting 
foreign direct investments via the CDM). During the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol it 
might have been necessary to exclude these countries in order to achieve any consensus at 
56 For recent numbers, see the CDM statistical database at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html und the JI statistical database at 
http://ji.unfccc.int/JI_Projects/ProjectInfo.html (both last accessed: 14.5.2012). 
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 all, but by now this decision proves to be one of the core weaknesses of global efforts to 
tackle climate change. Emerging countries like China57, India, Indonesia, South Africa or 
Brazil have tremendously increased their emissions but seem unwilling to reduce, usually 
arguing with their status as developing countries as well as the industrialized countries´ 
historic responsibility for climate change58. 
Second, the Kyoto Protocol is limited due to its commitment period ending in 2012 (Bodanksy 
2011a: 9). No regulations for the time after have been agreed upon by the international 
community and this has created a lot of uncertainty and certainly prevented individual states 
and economic actors from pursuing ambitious mitigation policies (this can be seen as an 
example of free-riding). The expiration of the Kyoto Protocol also creates repercussions on 
other regimes: it has been argued that since the Kyoto Protocol covers HFCs which are on the 
other hand promoted by the Montreal Protocol as substitutes for Chlorofuorocarbons and 
Hydrochlorofuorocarbons, there is a need to change the Montreal Protocol in order to avoid 
perverse incentives increasing the amount of GHGs (Velders et al. 2012). The first steps 
towards addressing these problems were taken at UNFCCC COP-13 in Bali in 2007. 
 
 
3.1.3. The Post-Kyoto Process 
  
In Bali, the UNFCCC´s signatory parties agreed to the Bali Action Plan59 that launched a 
parallel negotiation track under the UNFCCC in order to deal with a post-Kyoto agreement. A 
new subsidiary body was established, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention (AWC-LCA). The AWC-LCA was working parallelly to the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-
KP) that was established two years earlier at COP-11 in Montreal. Whereas the AWC-KP´s focus 
was on establishing perspectives on how to effectively extend the Kyoto Protocol and thus 
keep up the top-down-approach of the Kyoto Protocol, the AWG-LCA was officially open to 
any type of approach, but was effectively working on a bottom-up-approach. This was 
evident in the USA being a member of the AWG-LCA, but not of the AWG-KP (Bodansky 2010: 
3). The results of these working groups were presented two years later at the infamous COP-
15 in Copenhagen. All of the Kyoto Protocol´s Annex B-countries (including the EU) were 
supporting the AWG-LCA, as they were not willing to accept another round of binding 
commitments without developing countries taking on any by themselves (Ibid.). Developing 
countries on the other hand were pushing for the AWG-KP receiving equal attention (Ibid.). 
After two weeks of negotiations, a small group of heads of states (USA, China, Brazil, South 
Africa and India), representing a larger group of countries, negotiated what came to be 
known as the Copenhagen Accord60. It can be seen as a political rather than a legal 
document (Bodansky 2010: 5), as it is very short and does not specify a lot. Its main elements 
are: 
 
57 According to the United Nations Statistics Division, China passed the USA in 2005 in terms of total emissions: 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749&crid= (last accessed: 17.5.2012) 
58 In the case of China, another argument often forwarded is that the increase in emissions also has to do with China´s status as a major producer of 
manufactured goods for the industrialized countries (Heggelund et al. 2010: 233). 
59 The legal document is available online: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf (last accessed: 17.5.2012) 
60 Formally it was taken note of by the Conference of the Parties as FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 – Decision.2/CP.15       It is available online: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4 (last accessed: 17.5.2012) 
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 The long-term goal of limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C (Article 1). 
The initiation of a process for recording emissions targets submitted by Annex I parties 
(Article 4) and mitigation actions submitted by non-Annex I parties (Article 5). 
The establishment of a Green Climate Fund, equipped with 100 Billion Dollars annually by 
developing countries. The money shall be used to fund mitigation and adaptation in 
developing countries (Article 8). 
The establishment of a Technology Mechanism to accelerate the development and transfer of 
technologies for mitigation and adaptation (Article 11). 
The establishment of a mechanism to mobilize resources from developed countries in order 
to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) (Article 6). 
The agreement to support developing countries towards a low-emissions development path 
(Article 7). 
 
The Copenhagen Accord has been characterized as a bottom-up approach: it does not specify 
any reduction commitments but rather calls on the individual states to “further strengthen” 
(Article 4) their commitments made under the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. to make specific national 
pledges (Bodansky 2011a: 14). 
Especially civil-society organizations harshly criticized the Copenhagen Accord for not taking 
the necessary steps to prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change (see for example 
Traufetter 2009 or BBC 2009). The advocates of a bottom-up-approach have argued though 
that even if it may not be the most suitable way to combat anthropogenic climate change, it 
might still reflect the reality of domestic policies (in terms of which climate change is seen in 
most countries) more accurately than imposed reduction targets which countries might not 
be able to agree upon (Bodansky 2011a: 16). On the other hand, it seems doubtful, whether 
national pledges will be very ambitious (Ibid.). At least it will require substantial leadership by 
single countries or groups of countries in order to rule out free-riding. 
At COP-16 in Cancun in 2010 delegations reiterated their commitment to the Copenhagen 
Accord but failed to achieve any major progress. It was thus up to COP-17 in Durban in 
December 2011 to determine the future of the climate regime. The conference seemed like 
the last chance to negotiate a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol and thus 
maybe also to save the top-down-approach (Reimer 2011). It is noteworthy that even though 
the fixed reduction commitments of the Kyoto Protocol are terminated, the Protocol itself is 
not: this means that many of the articles and institutions (e.g. the flexible mechanisms) would 
remain intact (Bodansky 2011b:5-7). It seems unlikely though that they would be used in the 
absence of any fixed reduction targets, but they could nevertheless still be part of a future 
agreement. 
With only 13% of the global emissions covered by the Kyoto Protocol (Gillies 2011), a second 
commitment period would still have been a mere political statement rather than an effective 
approach, but one that would have strengthened the top-down-approach that is still 
preferred by the EU (Bodansky 2011b: 5). The main laggards in Durban turned out to be the 
USA, China61, India and Canada, even though the emergence of climate change as a more 
prominent issue in the global public sphere reduced their scope of resistance (Brake 2011). 
61 Heggelund and Bruzelius Backer (2007) have argued, that China might be aiming to establish itself at a leading position in international environmental 
politics. Looking back now, five years later, and taking into account the events at Durban 2011 and Rio+20, this prognosis seems a little misguided. At the 
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 In the end, the final outcome contained both, proposals from the AWG-KP62 and the AWG-
LCA63. 
The main AWG-LCA proposals that were decided on are: 
The negotiation of a new agreement64 which is to be negotiated beginning at COP-18 in 
Qatar in 2012 (Article 1). In 2015 the new treaty is supposed to be signed, coming into force in 
2020. It was left unclear whether the new agreement will eventually be connected with the 
Kyoto Protocol or replace it. The work shall be  carried out by the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Durban Platform of Action (AWG-DPA)65. 
The inclusion of developing countries´ efforts in a future agreement (Section B). 
The inclusion of the aviation and transportation sectors in future considerations of emissions 
reductions (Article 78). 
The decision to make the technology mechanism (now called Climate Technology Center and 
Network) operational by 2012 (Article 136). 
 
The main AWG-KP proposals that were decided on are: 
A second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol starting in 2012 and ending in 2017 or 
2020 (Article 1). The latter seems more likely, as the new agreement will be entering into 
force in 2020 the latest. 
The inclusion of nitrogen trifluoride to the list of GHGs covered under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Annex 2). 
Another important decision was the launch of the Green Climate Fund66. It will be decided in 
2012 where it will be situated, Germany (i.e. Bonn) being one of the applicants for the location 
of the fund (Bundesregierung 2011).  
Three points about the results of COP-17 seem noteworthy: first, progress towards a new 
international regulatory framework has been made with a compromise between the temporal 
extension of top-down-approach of the Kyoto Protocol and the bottom-up-approach being at 
the core of the post-Kyoto agreement. Also, the inclusion of all countries in the future 
agreement can be counted as a success. Finding no agreement at all in Durban would have 
rid the international climate politics of their credibility and legitimacy.  
Second, the establishment of the Green Climate Fund is an important step. The fund will 
probably not receive entirely “new multilateral funding” as demanded in the Cancun-
Agreements67 (Article 100 of FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1), but its establishment is important as it 
is likely to have an impact on the flows of official development assistance (ODA). Even though 
developed countries are far from achieving their, now 35 years old, commitment of increasing 
domestic level, environmental issues might be gaining importance (ibid: 415), but at the global level China does not seem to give much priority to environmental 
issues yet. 
62 Decision FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 is available online: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf (last accessed 18.5.2012) 
63 Decision FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/L.4 is available online: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/awglca14/eng/l04.pdf  (last accessed: 18.5.2012) 
64 It was left open whether this will be in the form of a protocol, legal instrument or an agreement with legal force (the first being the strongest, the last 
being the weakest instrument). 
65 Decision available online: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_durbanplatform.pdf (last accessed: 
18.5.2012) 
66 Decision FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 is available online: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf (last accessed: 18.5.2012) 
67 The Cancun Agreements where a set of decisions made at COP-16 in 2010 that were the results of the work of the AWG_LCA, AWG-KP and also 
considered further measures concerning LULUCF. The decisions can be accessed online: 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/3597.php?such=j&volltext=%22cancun%20agreements%22#beg (last accessed: 18.5.2012) 
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 their ODA to 0,7% of their GDP, it seems unlikely in the current economic situation that the 
fund will receive additional money. It seems more likely that there will be a redistribution of 
ODA in order to fill the Green Climate Fund, thus leading to a structural change in the 
distribution mechanisms of ODA. This is an important step, as the amount of money given out 
to climate related projects by other donor organizations like the Global Environment Facility 
(about 250 Million Dollars per year) (Michonski / Levi 2010: 6) or the World Bank (about 3,7 
Billion Dollars in 2008) (Ibid.: 17) is by far not close to this amount. Much will also depend on 
the allocation mechanisms and the types of projects the fund will give money to. As private 
economic actors will likely have to play an important role in the decarbonization of the 
economy, it has been proposed that the fund´s money might at least in part be used to lower 
the risks of major projects in order to make them attractive for private investors (Runnalls 
2011: 7). 
Third, the inclusion of the aviation and transportation sectors in future considerations of 
emissions is an important step towards changing unsustainable patterns of consumption and 
production. It opens up possibilities and – more important – incentives to restrict 
unsustainable behavior and promote regional consumption and production. 
It still remains to be seen what form the international efforts towards climate change 
governance will take. As a bottom-up-approach seems likely in the long run, a lot depends on 
individual countries and groups of countries taking leadership by offering ambitious 
reduction commitments in order to create enough trust and make long-term cooperation 
under a bottom-up-approach possible. It is also questionable whether the path should be 
pursued under the UNFCCC. In 2000 the top 25 GHG emitters accounted for 85% of global 
GHG emissions and the top 5 emitters today (China, USA, EU, India and Russia) account for 
60% of global GHG emissions (Leal-Arcas 2012: 4). It might be more promising to move the 
agenda of climate change to a club of major emitters, even though due to the intrinsic 
linkage between the climate regime and the international trade regime this might produce 
frictions with the WTO´s non-discrimination principle (Ibid: 54).  
We have now developed an understanding of the regulatory legal framework developed at 
the UN level to tackle climate change. An understanding of these institutions is important as 
they are a constant point of reference in climate politics. It would be wrong to stop our 
analysis at this point, even though in political science there is a “tendency to associate specific 
international issues with dedicated multilateral institutions” (Michonski / Levi 2010: 1) that 
nevertheless fails “to properly capture the reality of global governance, institutions, and 
regimes” (Ibid.). There are shortcomings in a couple of areas of the UN´s legal regime. These 
deficits along with national interests are among the root causes for what Keohane and Victor 
have called a “cambrian explosion” (2011: 12), “a proliferation of organizations, rules, 
implementing mechanisms, financing arrangements and operational activities” (Abbott 2011: 
1). We should therefore now shift our attention to the broader regime complex of climate 
change and develop an understanding of it in order to analyze the way Rio+20´s framing of a 
green economy in its outcome document “The Future We Want” is interacting with this 
regime complex. 
 
3.2. The regime complex of climate change 
  
Robert Keohane and David Victor (2011 and 2010) have conceptualized the regime complex 
of climate change mainly in terms of loosely coupled intergovernmental cooperation. They 
have visualized their findings in a map that is reproduced in Figure 3. It has been argued that 
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 this map “makes a valuable contribution by highlighting the multiple forms of governance 
(e.g., multilateral, bilateral, club, expert), issue areas (e.g., adaptation, nuclear, trade, financial), 
and governance functions (e.g., assessment, rule-making, financial assistance) that figure in 
the climate change regime” (Abbott 2011: 4). 
The regime complex of climate change can be seen as a complex consisting of multi-level 
processes involving a multitude of actors at all levels:  
“[T]he complete regime complex for climate change should be understood to also include 
bilateral relationships (such as that between the United States and China), efforts under the 
UNFCCC (such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism), as well as the 
national laws and institutions in individual countries that will develop and execute those 
countries´ domestic and foreign policy responses to climate change. (…) [T]he full regime 
complex also includes international institutions that draw together either private actors (as is 
the case with the Chicago Climate Exchange) or a mix of private and public players (such as in 
the case of the International Standards Organization)” (Michonski / Levi 2010: 2). 
Kenneth Abbott (2011) has also highlighted the importance of accounting for transnational 
actors in the analysis of the regime complex of climate change which he explicitly refers to as 
the “transnational regime complex for climate change” that is characterized by 
fragmentation, polycentrism and decentralization (Ibid: 1). When analyzing the relevant 
actors, it is thus important to pay attention to actors from three major categories: “State, Firm 
and Civil Society Actors” (Ibid: 6). 
 
Figure 3: The Regime Complex for Climate Change (Source: Keohane / Victor 2011: 10; own representation due to 
bad quality in original). Keohane and Victor indicate that “[b]oxes show the main institutional elements and 
initiatives (…). Elements inside the oval represent forums where substantial efforts at rule-making have occurred, 
focused on one or more of the tasks needed to manage the diversity of cooperation problems that arise with climate 
change ; elements outside are areas where climate rule making is requiring additional, supporting rules“ (Ibid.). For 
a more detailed description of many of the actors mentioned here see Michonski / Levi 2010. 39 
 The map of Keohane and Victor is also far from complete. UNEP, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC forum), the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Programme (FAO), the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
are just a few examples of organizations that play a role in climate governance. Here is not the 
place to elaborate on their individual roles, but the interested reader may find a detailed 
elaboration of this in Katherine Michonski and Michael Levi´s working paper (2010) for the 
Council of Foreign Relations (see also Busch et al. 2012; Tienhaara et al. 2012; Gupta et al. 
2012). 
 
According to the six normative assessment criteria by Keohane and Victor that we have 
discussed in chapter 2.7, the regime complex of climate change does not score high: There is 
low coherence and accountability due to the division between Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries; the lack of accountability mechanisms in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
reduces determinacy; the lack of political will demonstrated by the USA and China reduce the 
sustainability and fairness of the regime; and the epistemic quality is also lacking due to the 
efforts required to change the rules (Keohane / Victor 2011: 17). 
A key lesson for policy-makers derived from this is that there is already a plethora of 
institutions addressing climate change and that a careful redesign might be more useful than 
the creation of new institutions (Michonski / Levi 2010: 3). Even though bilateral cooperation 
is becoming more important, a further development of the international cooperation under 
the UNFCCC still remains central and should be pursued with determination (WBGU 2010: 6). 
It is important though to anticipate areas where conflicts with other institutions and regimes 
may arise, e.g. with WTO and the global trade regime (Michonski / Levi 2010: 4). Especially if 
emissions trading is to stay one of the key mechanisms in regulating global emissions 
(supposing that long-term goals for emissions will be part of a future agreement), it might be 
helpful to establish border tax adjustments (BTAs)68 to create incentives for countries to join 
an emissions trading system (Keohane / Victor 2011: 18). There has been an increase in 
decentralized and local initiatives by companies, administrations and civil-society groups that 
actively work towards reducing GHG-emissions and that should thus be supported more 
actively by policy makers (WBGU 2010: 6).  
Lastly, policy makers need to be wary of the fact that the growth of a regime complex leads to 
a shift in style from top-down policies to more loose bottom-up policies (Raustiala / Victor 
2004: 306). As more actors become involved, the possibilities of “turf battles and eroding 
responsibility may follow” (Andresen 2002: 24) and thus more informal modes of cooperation 
might be more fruitful. This nevertheless requires long-term commitments and leadership by 
individual actors. Strong national commitments (not necessarily tied to any international 
treaties) are also necessary in order to mobilize financing for mitigation projects (e.g. through 
carbon markets or taxes) (Panitchpakdi 2011: 8). 
 
68 Sometimes also referred to as Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs), aiming at inferring a tax “...on imports based on the environmental footprint of their 
production and transportation.“ (Panitchpakdi 2011: 4) 
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 4. Rio+20´s Green Economy 
 
It is now time to shift attention to the second analytical field of this paper: the idea of a Green 
Economy as it was framed in the UNCSD´s outcome document “The Future We Want” (UN 
2012a). Before going into detail on the actual decision itself and later its implications for the 
climate regime, it seems necessary to develop an idea about the theoretical perspective 
green economy is based on: ecological modernization. I will therefore first elaborate in this 
chapter on this perspective and its basic ideas as well as limitations. Afterwards, the 
development of the idea of a Green Economy and the way it was framed before the UNCSD 
shall be analyzed before shifting attention to the actual outcome document and the guidance 
it delivers for future development processes. 
 
4.1. Ecological Modernization 
 
It is helpful to have a look into environmental sociology (where the theory originated from) if 
we want to understand how ecological modernization emerged as one of the general 
principles of environmental policy making. In 1972 the Club of Rome published its famous 
report “The limits to growth” (Meadows et al. 1972). The report used computer modeling to 
predict the consequences of unregulated industrialization processes, as well as increases in 
population growth, nutrition levels and pollution in an environment of finite resources. The 
results were drastic: if industrialization, population growth, food production, pollution and 
the consumption of resources would continue to grow, the Earth´s carrying capacity would 
be reached within one hundred years (Ibid: 17). Instead of growth, the authors called for an 
ecological and economic state of stability without growth, as this was the only scenario in 
which their models did not collapse (Ibid.). The report had an immense influence on the 
development of the environmental movement, as it provided a solid basis for establishing the 
environmental discourse in the mainstream discourse (Huber 2011a: 135). The logical 
consequence of the Malthusian results of the “The limits to Growth” was the call for a 
renunciation of growth and consumption. This was of course a challenge to the status-quo of 
capitalist production and this was also reflected in the environmental movement: hippies, the 
new social movements and the emerging green parties challenged the industrial 
establishment and thus met resistance, even though they were able to dominate the 
environmental discourse – not least because of the arguments presented by The Limits to 
Growth (Ibid: 136-138). 
By the mid-1970s resistance from the industrial elites was mainly limited to framing the issue 
as a question of ecology versus economy (environmental protection or jobs), but by the mid 
1970s approaches emerged that aimed at highlighting the qualitative rather than the 
quantitative dimension of growth (Ibid: 139). Approaches focusing on organic growth, 
qualitative growth, selective growth or decoupled growth provided new perspectives and 
solutions and thus contributed to advancing the environmental discourse even though they 
were far from perfect (Ibid: 139-142). The model of decoupled growth was an important 
precursor of ecological modernization: it was basically the idea that there is no 1:1 relation 
between growth in terms of income and growth in terms of the input of resources as 
consumers have an interest in low prices and these can only be achieved if production is 
made more efficient and thus less resource intensive (Ibid: 142). Eco-efficiency and industrial 
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 innovation are among the core principles of Ecological Modernization Theory (EMT) as we 
shall see.  
During the early 1980s European social scientists69 – most notably in Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom – developed a “technology-based and innovation 
oriented approach to environmental policy” (Jänicke 2008: 557). EMT should be seen in the 
tradition of sociological modernization theory that views modernization as a continuing, 
path-dependent and knowledge-based process of transition from traditional to modern 
societies (Huber 2011b: 280). Furthermore, modernization is seen as a mechanism driven by 
market logic (Jänicke 2008: 557). It thus accepts the logic of modern capitalism without 
questioning it and can therefore be seen as a rather pro-modal theory. 
EMT views modernized societies as having the best chances to adapt, even though the 
possibility of a post-modern society with different social and cultural features is not ruled out 
(Parsons 2009: 16). Nevertheless does EMT stick to the premise of continuing modernization 
(Huber 2011a: 143) and is thus distinct from other approaches like postmodernist approaches 
or some neo-marxist approaches with their focus on the individual´s behavior (Mol / 
Sonnefeld 2000: 5). It also contrasts with the idea of conservation that wishes to reestablish or 
conserve a certain status whereas EMT is more progressive, less occupied with fixed goals and 
clearly anthropocentric (Huber 2011b: 282). 
A second important premise of EMT is that there is not necessarily an antagonism of ecology 
and economy as it was framed by the environmental movement of the 1970s (Huber 2011a: 
143). Instead it is argued that the reduction of environmental impacts through innovation 
and increased productivity of economic processes can be a source of economic growth and 
thus of welfare just like conventional economic growth. “Central to [EMT] is the view that the 
era of late modernity offers promise that industrialization, technological development, 
economic growth, and capitalism are not only potentially compatible with ecological 
sustainability but also may be key drivers of environmental reforms” (York / Rosa 2003: 274). 
“Ecological modernization argues that while the most pressing environmental problems of 
the last century were caused by industrialization and modernization, the solution does not 
reside in either deindustrialization or demodernization; instead a programme of more 
industrialization and modernization is needed” (Carolan 2004: 249). 
It is important to highlight that ecological modernization is not a process limited to the 
material dimension of the economy, but it is “...social and institutional transformations which 
have been and still are at the core of much current scholarship on ecological modernisation 
[sic]” (Mol / Sonnenfeld 2000: 6)70. The German Advisory Council on Global Change 
(WBGU)71 also highlighted the central role of transformational processes72 in a report (2011) 
published in the forefront of UNCSD, calling for measures of ecological modernization (Ibid.: 
6-7). The focus on transformations that naturally occur from a given starting point again 
highlight the pro-modal tendency of EMT, as the focus is on changing a status-quo from 
within and not replacing it, as some critical theories aim for. 
The driving forces behind the process of ecological modernization are thus threefold: first, 
there is the market logic of modernization, second, building upon this is the competition for 
69 Important contributors during this time were Martin Jänicke, Volker von Prittwitz, Udo Simonis, Klaus Zimmermann, Gert Spaargaren, Maarten Hajer, 
Arthur P.J. Mol, Albert Weale, Maurie Colen and Joseph (Mol / Sonnenfeld 2000:4). 
70 These processes include 1) a changing role of science and technology as potential preventers and not just causes of ecological destruction, 2) an 
increasing importance of market dynamics and economic agents, 3) transformations in the role of nation states, 4) modifications in the role and ideology of social 
movements, and 5) changing discursive practices and emerging new ideologies (Mol / Sonennfeld 2000: 6-7) 
71 The German Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat globale Umweltveränderungen) is an advisory body of the German 
government. It was established in 1992 and its purpose is to provide the government with knowledge as well as policy and research suggestions regarding global 
change processes.  
72 The report also refers to Karl Polanyi´s „Great Transformation“ as an analogy and base of reference for its argument (WBGU 2011: 2). 
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 innovation that participants of a market are forced to enter into, and third, the potential 
marketability of environmental needs (Jänicke 2008: 557).  
Theorists of ecological modernization argue that only the industry sector with its innovative 
networks and established structures of cooperation is able to undertake the steps necessary 
for a structural change at the necessary size (Huber 2011a: 145). Especially developed 
countries with high technological standards are seen as the places where the necessary 
innovations take place and will then diffuse, especially due to the actions of internationally 
active companies from these countries (Huber 2008; Jänicke 2003; Tienhaara et al. 2012). An 
important distinction regarding innovations is the differentiation of weak environmental 
innovations (being limited to niche markets and/or only consisting of incremental changes) 
and strong environmental innovations (with a high market penetration and/or radical 
changes) (Jänicke / Lindemann 2010: 129). 
The role of the political system is seen as a provider of conditions that enable and foster 
environmental innovation: instruments of innovation policy (project funding for research & 
development as well as for market launch) and environmental policy (e.g. taxes, tradable 
permits, command & control measures, green public procurement and the introduction of 
eco-labels) can be used to support the different phases of the process of innovation 
(invention, market launch, diffusion) (Jänicke / Lindemann 2010: 131). Furthermore, it is 
argued that policy-makers should support innovations during the early phases of the supply 
chain, as these tend to have greater environmental impacts than later phases (Huber 2010b: 
290).  
Even though EMT accepts the logic of modern capitalism, it distances itself from neoclassical 
approaches that sometimes tend to underestimate the policy process (Jänicke 2008: 559). 
Instead, the role of political regulation is highlighted as one of the driving forces of 
environmental innovation (Ibid.), as environmental innovations originating from uncontrolled 
market activities are considered to be too slow to contribute to the solution of global 
environmental problems (Jänicke 2011: 140). An often referenced model of political steering 
is the Japanese top-runner-approach (e.g. Huber 2011a: 294 and Jänicke 2008: 559)73. In sum, 
even though the role of government support is characterized as having a greater impact 
during early phases of the innovation process and supply chain, theorists of ecological 
modernization argue that “smart regulation” - i.e. the combination of ambitious 
environmental targets with a well-thought combination of policy instruments (market-based, 
regulatory, supporting) – is needed in order to initiate and promote ecological modernization 
processes (Jänicke / Lindemann 2010: 135 and Jänicke 2008: 559). 
Theorists of EMT have been quite enthusiastic about their theory, especially during the 1990s. 
Arthur P.J. Mol has even gone so far as to state “...that the only possible way out of the 
ecological crisis is by going further into process of modernization” (Mol 1995: 42; cited from 
York / Rosa 2003). He later softened this claim by stating that ecological modernization is not 
a panacea (Mol / Sonnenfeld 2000: 3). Similarly, Martin Jänicke noted: “The potential of 
“ecological modernisation” to radically reduce the environmental burden of industrial growth 
is without any alternative” (2008: 563; brackets in original). In response to these nonetheless 
strong claims, EMT has been the target of much criticism, an overview of which shall be given 
now. 
 
73 The top-runner-approach – that was first applied in Japan – aims at supporting the diffusion of environmentally friendlier production methods 
throughout a sector, e.g. electronic devices. In order to achieve this, the most efficient product of a certain type is being elevated as the mandatory standard which 
other products will have to match within a certain period, e.g. 5 years. In order to assert pressure on producers, a tactic of naming and shaming is being applied 
during the fulfillment period. The approach has proven to be quite successful, as it has led to many efficiency gains in several product areas, often even exceeding 
the goal of the current fulfillment period (for a more detailed account see Jänicke 2008: 560 or Jänicke / Lindemann 2010: 134) 
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4.1.1. Critical Views on Ecological Modernization 
 
EMT is far from being unchallenged. Criticism has been brought forward from the theory itself 
as well as from other theoretical perspectives. 
One challenge to the idea of innovation based on ecological protection could be called the 
race-to-the-bottom-argument. It basically states that under the condition of a globalized 
market where governments influence the allocation of foreign direct investment by the level 
of standards that they apply in different sectors (e.g. environment or labor), strong 
environmental standards and goals are unlikely. Instead, governments are more likely to 
continuously lower their environmental standards. Martin Jänicke argued against this 
objection that environmental innovations are by now a main driver of innovative competition 
between countries and that ambitious environmental standards can help countries to 
establish lead-markets and gain “first-mover advantages” (Jänicke 2003: 8). 
Another argument concerns the resistance which the diffusion of innovations might cause: 
“Innovations are always linked with ´creative destruction´ and thereby produce 
´modernization losers´ - a highly conflictual process that is often ignored in the current 
´innovation euphoria´” (Jänicke / Lindemann 2010: 135; quotation marks in original). An 
example for this has been brought forward by Horlings and Marsden (2011: 449) who 
explored the potential of ecological modernization towards meeting the world´s future food 
demands and who identified the resistance of corporate market actors as one of the main 
impediments of fundamentally changing the structure of the world´s agricultural system. Still, 
this argument concerns the procedural dimension of societal change and can thus not be an 
argument against EMT. Societal changes always create resistance, as there will always be 
members of society that profit from the status-quo and thus have an interest in conserving it. 
After all, this is the core of conservative thought. Nevertheless, policy-makers do have to 
remember this conflictual dimension when designing instruments to support processes of 
ecological modernization. Jänicke calls for “structural solutions” to overcome this resistance, 
even though he fails to specify what exactly is meant by this and instead calls for further 
research towards this field (Jänicke 2008: 564). 
Another important argument against EMT is counter-technocratic: “...technology simply 
cannot solve all environmental problems” (Jänicke / Lindemann 2010: 135). The loss of 
biodiversity or the degradation of soil are two examples for global environmental problems 
where technological solutions are rare – if there are any at all. One could take this even further 
and argue that certain types of ecological modernization processes are creating new 
environmental problems: the planned large-scale installation of solar-thermic-plants in 
Northern Africa might have an impact on biodiversity in that era. Or the increasing installation 
of wind power plants could lead to an increase in demand for Neodymium, a rare earth metal, 
the production of which could lead to harsh environmental impacts due to poisonous residue 
from the production process (Schoßig 2011: 3). 
The focus on pioneer countries and lead-markets brings with it another important problem: 
companies able to create innovations and governments able to deliver the necessary political 
support to accelerate these processes are not equally spread around the globe. Instead, it is 
mostly advanced industrialized countries that produce the majority of environmental 
innovations, most notably the axis North America-Europe-Japan (Huber 2011b: 294). Even 
though some of the newly industrialized countries (e.g. China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Mexico, or 
South Africa) are certainly closing the gap, there still remain barriers in these countries not 
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 mentioning the large number of developing countries (Ibid.). This trend of ecological 
modernization has been criticized from within the theory, but it also seems quite critical from 
an egalitarian point of view as it could further exacerbate the existing differentials in 
countries´ levels of modernity and (even more important) structurally embedded hierarchies 
between countries in the global political system. Theoretically, developing and newly 
industrialized countries could gain some advantages by leapfrogging74 or tunneling-
through75, but these possibilities are not open to all countries due to a lack of cultural 
coherence and national stability (Huber 2008: 365). 
In a more general way, EMT has also been criticized for its “Eurocentricity” (Buttel 2000: 64), 
that is “...the fact that its theoretical roots and empirical examples are largely taken from a set 
of Northern European countries that are distinctive by world standards” (Ibid.). 
EMT has also been criticized from a neo-marxist perspective of environmental sociology for 
being too underconceptualized with regard to consumption. Michael Carolan (2004) has 
argued that as the focus of EMT lies on the production processes it is only addressing a part of 
the problem: “...any resolution to our global ecological problems can only be achieved 
through the problematization of both production and consumption” (Ibid.: 248). For Carolan, 
a change in consumption patterns contradicts the materialist nature of the capitalist 
production system and the alienation caused by this system is unlikely to be overcome by 
simply greening the production patterns: “Few in this world are ready to give up on jewelry, 
cars, big-screen televisions, and computers, although many would like them produced in as 
“green” a manner as possible. And the billions that do not yet possess these items are far from 
giving up on the idea of one day having them in their possession” (Ibid.: 253; quotation marks 
in original). Carolan instead calls for a more radical, reflexive and holistic approach to 
ecological modernization instead of only viewing it in “techno-corporatist” terms (Ibid.: 255).  
In direct reply to this critique Arthur Mol and Gert Spaargaren (2000) have argued that the 
process of ecological modernization itself and the changes in productive patterns will 
automatically lead to changing consumption patterns. They admit that EMT has in its early 
days failed to sufficiently recognize consumption as an important variable (Ibid.: 263). They 
nevertheless fail to base their claim of production patterns changing in response to processes 
of ecological modernization on a solid argumentation and the response thus does not seem 
very convincing. 
David Pepper (1998) has argued in a similar direction as Carolan, but from a more policy-
oriented eco-socialist perspective. For him, ecological modernization and the policies 
implementing it are the expression of “...capital doing what it must do...” (Ibid.: 5), namely 
economizing the environment in order to prevent environmental damage exceeding the 
point where its costs outbalance its gains. I have already mentioned that EMT is based on an 
anthropocentric perspective, but Pepper makes it explicit: “...[EMT] completely discounts the 
radical environmentalist´s argument about intrinsic value, existence value and any other 
intrinsically non-monetizable value of the environment” (Ibid.).  
Pepper nevertheless argues from an anthropocentric perspective as well, calling for a 
restructuring of economic and political institutions and arrangements “...such as credit 
unions, local exchange and trading systems (LETS), community land banks, basic income 
schemes, farm-to-doorstep distribution, local energy production based on renewables, 
municipalization of bureaucracies, community and neighbourhood groups and collectivized, 
74 “Leapfrogging means bypassing one or two generations of technology and directly skipping into the latest generation, e.g. mobile-phone networks 
without a previously installed full-scale fixed-line network, or adopting the electric arc furnace in steel industry, jumping the basic oxygen and the open hearth 
process“ (Huber 2008: 365) 
75 “The term is derived from the model of the inverted U-shaped environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). EKCs describe environmental intensity , i.e., resource 
consumption and pollution per unit product, as at first increasing, thereafter decreasing, in correspondence to development stage (…). Countries which develop 
later might avoid climbing to old-industrial heights of resource consumption and pollution by ´tunneling´ through those old-industrial EKCs“ (Huber 2008: 365) 
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 self-managed enterprises” (Ibid.: 6). Interestingly, Pepper recognizes the ambivalence 
inherent in his proposal: in order to achieve this restructuring without just resorting to pre-
industrialized levels, there is a need for the tools and achievements of modernization, for 
example modern communications techniques (Ibid.: 7). He nonetheless fails (as unfortunately 
many critical approaches do) to advance his approach beyond the level of a thought 
experiment. 
For Michael Kohler (2000), one of the central arguments against EMT (as well as 
modernization theory in general) is the implausibility of the approach´s anthropology: the 
premise of the “...well-informed, rational actor who understands and pursues her authentic 
moral interests. Such voluntarism is implausible for many reasons, not least because it 
presumes that individuals will choose to forgo certain tangible benefits in their day-to-day 
lives in order to secure other benefits, sometimes quite intangible, for others that they will 
never know” (Ibid.: 208) 
Richard York and Eugene Rosa (2003) have challenged EMT on multiple levels. Via a 
quantitative analysis of 154 nations´ ratifications of 22 multilateral environmental agreements 
they could show that there is a significant correlation between a country´s ratification 
behavior and its per capita emissions of carbon dioxide (Ibid.: 276). They also conducted a 
research program to analyze the effect of state environmentalism on a nation´s 
environmental impact. They could not find an effect, even when comparing EU-countries 
(often regarded as advanced in terms of ecological modernization). This led them to the claim 
that modernization processes do not “...reduce environmental problems and bring about a 
transition to sustainability...” (Ibid.: 275) but rather that “...it has little to say about ecological 
crises and environmental sustainability […] other than that societies react to these issues with 
institutional structures that convey the impression of solving environmental problems” (Ibid.). 
York and Rosa have also challenged the relevance of EMT from another empirical direction: 
they claim that the majority of studies focuses on case studies and that there is a lack of meta-
analysis accounting for stochastic variance (Ibid.: 277). “This raises the question of whether in 
fact ecological improvements in modern societies, industries and firms are widespread. It may 
be instead simply that reports about the few examples that exist of ecological improvements 
are widespread” (Ibid.: 278; italics in original). 
Furthermore, York and Rosa criticize that scholars applying EMT need to be careful when 
choosing their unit of analysis, as a sectoral (mostly national) perspective tends to overlook 
the flows of resources in a globalized economy. They deem this the “Netherlands Fallacy”, as a 
large part of the resources consumed in the Netherlands comes from other countries (Ibid.: 
279). 
Criticism and support have also been brought forward from the perspective of sustainable 
development. As this is a focus of the masters program in which this thesis is written, I will 
dedicate it a short chapter of its own. 
 
4.1.2. Ecological Modernization and Sustainable Development 
 
Sustainable Development (SD) could nowadays be classified as the most important point of 
reference for environmental policies (Zaccai 2012: 87). This is noteworthy, as the concept itself 
is not restricted to environmental issues. Instead, it aims at reconciling several aspects of 
development with the ultimate goal of eliminating the externalized effects of global 
economic activities in a way that future generations will have the same chances as present 
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 generations – i.e. making our way of living sustainable. In 1987 the report “Our common 
future” (WCED, 1987) by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED)76 explicitly outlined the concept for the first time77: 
 
“Sustainable Development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it 
two key concepts: 
the concept of ´needs´, in particular the essential needs of the world´s poor, to which 
overriding priority should be given; and 
the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the 
environment´s ability to meet present and future needs.” (WCED 1987: 41)  
 
SD as conceptualized by the WCED thus contains two notions: first, that there are basic needs 
shared by all humans that should be satisfied. Second, that the carrying capacity of the global 
ecosystem is limited and increasingly put under pressure by population and development 
dynamics. 
In order to achieve SD, the report lists seven strategic imperatives: (1) reviving growth; (2) 
changing the quality of growth; (3) Meeting essential human needs; (4) Ensuring a sustainable 
level of production; (5) Conserving and enhancing the resource base; (6) Reorienting 
technology and managing risk; and (7) Merging environment and economics in decision 
making (Ibid.: 41). 
It should be noted that the agreement on SD in the WCED has been partly explained with the 
prevailing differences between the North and the South regarding the connection of 
environment and development (especially the international economic relations at the heart 
of it) and that SD served as a kind of compromise formula “...to which everybody could 
subscribe. It was appealing, sufficiently vague and had multiple possible meanings” Gosovic 
2011: 89). 
The crucial impetus for the concept on the international level came with the UNCED in 1992 
and its core documents: the Rio-Declaration the two major environmental conventions 
(climate, biodiversity) and the forest declaration (Huber 2010a: 155). As a program of 
implementation of SD, Agenda 21 also has to be mentioned, as – together with its 
implementation at the local level (Local Agenda 21) – it had a large share in the global 
implementation of SD. The establishment of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) with its 
tripartite decision-making structure based on equal representation of stakeholders from the 
three pillars of sustainable development (economy, ecology, social) (Garrelts / Flittner 2011) 
could serve as an example of the implementation of SD as envisioned in Agenda 21 (Pattberg 
2012: 104). 
The Rio-Declaration reconfirmed the goals of the WCED´s report and for the first ten years 
after UNCED at least in European policies78 the concept has been centered around the 
connection of environmental and ecological issues: “Aligned with, but not identical to 
76 The commission is often being referred to as “Brundtland Commission“ (e.g. Zaccai 2012: 80) in reference to its chairwoman Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
who has also been Norwegian prime minister three times. Similarly the WCED´s report is sometimes also being referred to as “Brundtland-Report“ (e.g. Huber 
2010a: 155). 
77 Similar concepts can still be traced further backwards. Oluf Langhelle for example has argued that a concept quite similar can be found in the work done 
by the World Council of Churches (Langhelle 2000: 306). 
78 During a time in which the EU was one of the major driving forces in international environmental governance (Ott / Chung 2005: 89). 
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 Brundtland´s strategic imperatives, the aims of environmental integration and the implication 
of major sectors in this respect capture the essence of European sustainable development 
policies, at least until the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 
2002” (Zaccai 2012: 80). On a global scale, SD has signaled that development and 
environment are not necessarily conflicting (quite similar to EMT), even though challenges 
and tensions between the two fields remain (Dubash 2012: 49). 
The most common denominator of the concept of SD can arguably be found in the three-
pillars-approach, i.e. the balancing of ecological, environmental and social objectives that 
became more influential after the 2002 WSSD (Ibid.). In reference to the magical diamond of 
economic policies (achieving economic growth, price stability, full employment and a stable 
balance of trade) whose individual goals are not to be achieved without decreasing the 
success of the others, the three-pillars-approach has also been labeled as the “magical 
triangle” (Huber 2010a: 155).  
Nevertheless, the concept of three pillars of SD needs further specification as it is otherwise 
quite difficult to derive concrete actions necessary for the achievement of SD. This argument 
becomes more valid if we look at the multitude of definitions of SD that exist beyond the 
official documents. Oluf Langhelle (2000) has argued that the definition and its base of 
reference are crucial in this context: “The point of departure here is that how the problem is 
framed (which includes the way it is defined) also has implications for what is seen as 
necessary changes (Ibid.: 307). Edwin Zaccai has also pointed towards different actors using 
different interpretations of SD: “Beyond [the] official definitions, the interpretation of 
sustainable development has always been a kind of game that academic, political, and social 
actors can play, because of its openness and plasticity to every context” (Zaccai 2012: 81).  
These actors include national governments that establish national strategies for sustainable 
development (e.g. Bundesregierung 2002), supranational entities like the EU shaping the 
political processes of their member states (Ott / Chung 2005) and non-state actors engaging 
in the development of scenarios for SD (e.g. Hans-Böckler Stiftung 2000) or specifying the 
concept to issue-areas like local governments (e.g. ICLEI 2003) or environment (e.g. 
Greenpeace 2012).  
Also, transnational non-state actors play an increasingly important role (Pattberg 2012). Due 
to the lack of strong institutions for global governance, economic globalization has led to a 
deficit in the nation states´ capability to regulate the activities of business actors, especially 
those of trans-national companies (TNCs). This has caused an increase in soft steering 
instruments being applied by state and non-state actors in order to achieve (1) normative and 
regulatory effects, (2) discursive effects or (3) material and structural effects (Ibid.: 100-101). 
These instruments include market-based instruments (as in climate governance), voluntary 
commitments and standards, collaborative action between a variety of (governmental, non-
governmental and business) actors, and the increased use of information instruments (Zaccai 
2012: 83).  
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is closely tied to this idea of integrating 
firms in the implementation of SD. UNCED in 1992 marked the beginning of increasing 
engagement of private economic actors as is exemplified in the creation of the Business 
Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD)79 (Runnalls 2011: 2). By orienting their internal 
processes on sustainability, companies might gain reputation benefits, thus creating a win-
win-situation between SD and business interests80. This trend has further increased since the 
79 In 1995 the BCSD merged with the World Industry Council for the Environment (WICE) to form the World Business Council on Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD). 
80 The industries´ interest in SD was also increased by their interest in escaping the debate about risks that started during the 1980s (Huber 2010a: 161 and 
Brand 2010: 136) and that was most prominently represented by Ulrich Beck (e.g. 1986). 
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 2002 WSSD that launched many public-private cooperations, the so called Partnerships for 
Sustainable Development (Biermann 2007: 332). In the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
(JPOI)81, governments also committed themselves “...to enhance corporate environmental 
and social responsibility and accountability through legislative initiatives, with the aim of 
encouraging the business sector to improve social and environmental performance through 
voluntary initiatives, including environmental management systems and public reporting on 
environmental and social issues” (Bertazzi 2011: 71). CSR-reporting is now practiced by more 
than 2000 corporations in over 90 countries (Panitchpakdi 2011: 3).  
It should be noted though that these measures can only be successful if they are 
implemented in a multi-level system of governance (Zimpelmann / Zöckler 2008: 137) and 
that the notion of win-win-situations only applies at the macro-level as there will necessarily 
be winners and losers and thus conflict (Langhelle 2000: 316).  
SD and Sustainability82 – which are often used as synonyms – have become terms with an 
incredible amount of references and interpretations from very different spheres and actors, a 
fact that contributed to the success and the failure of SD – depending on the point of view 
taken: “...sustainable development creates a consensus formula which enables actors to 
pursue their interests and norms to de-legitimize other norms and interests which go beyond 
these [formulas]” (Brand 2010: 142). In this sense, SD is quite an oxymoron (Brand 2012: 29). 
The distinction between strong and weak sustainability is important, the latter accepting that 
natural capital could be substituted by technologically produced capital, whereas the former 
entails the idea that natural capital cannot be substituted and therefore needs to be 
preserved and restored (Huber 2010a: 157-158). The two notions of sustainability also 
represent two frames with far-reaching consequences regarding the necessary changes: 
efficiency (weak sustainability) and sufficiency (strong sustainability)83 (Ibid.: 161 and 166). 
Whereas the sufficiency-oriented approach seems to be more holistic and demanding more 
fundamental change (and its supporters usually coming from the political left), the form of 
sustainable development derived out of the Rio-process has for example been criticized by 
neo-marxists for being efficiency-oriented and driven by the logic of the contemporary 
capitalist economy: “[b]y not questioning the logic of capitalist accumulation and the model 
of industrial society as the fundamental causes of the destruction of the conditions that make 
life possible, it provided new legitimacy to neoliberal globalisation[sic], which began to 
present itself as sustainable, despite its overwhelmingly devastating dynamic” (Lander 
2011:3). 
This is however not the place to engage in an in-depth discussion of SD, as this could easily fill 
another paper the size of this one. Therefore, I will now focus on some of the arguments for 
and against ecological modernization that have been brought forward from the perspective 
of SD: 
If we take the three-pillars-approach as a basis, then one point of criticism becomes obvious: 
as EMT aims at reconciling ecology and economy, it tends to overlook the social dimension. 
SD incorporates this dimension, taking into account the north-south-divide, a concept of 
81 The JPOI´s legal text can be found online: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf (last accessed: 
16.7.2012) 
82 Ulrich Grober (2010) has written a highly readable, yet in parts somewhat inaccurate, cultural history of the term sustainability, wherein he traces the 
origins and developments of the term. 
83 Sufficiency aims at changing lifestyles and consumption patterns, e.g. by promoting abstinence of consumption, contemplation and deceleration as 
values in themselves (Huber 2010a: 161). Efficiency on the other hand aims at further decoupling economic development and ecological impacts from each other 
(Ibid.). Sufficiency-strategies manifest themselves in bourgeois concepts like the LOHAS (Lifestyle of Health and Sustainability) and are not adaptable on a global 
scale as they presuppose a level of access to resources that cannot be guaranteed at a global scale. Efficiency strategies are more pragmatic as can be seen in 
Ecological Modernization Theory which clearly represents an approach from efficiency. 
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 justice (intra- and inter-generational), basic ´needs´ of human beings and the embedment of 
human beings in social as well as ecological and economic relations. 
Furthermore, EMT has been criticized for being able to solve smaller environmental problems 
like pollution, chemical waste or acidification, but lacking the ability to solve “ecological high-
consequence risks” (Langhelle 2000: 309) like climate change, as these require a more 
fundamental approach that goes beyond technical solutions and thus provides a more 
fundamental critique, taking account of modern “existential anxiety” (Ibid.) and targeting 
current patterns of production and consumption. This is certainly true for the type of SD 
building on the strong notion of sustainability. 
The strong notion of sustainability also leads to a perspective on SD that has to prioritize 
different environmental problems according to their relevance for moving towards a more 
sustainable world. For Oluf Langhelle, this leads to a priority of climate change84 and actions 
targeting the energy sector and he criticizes EMT for not being able to make these 
distinctions between different environmental problems (Ibid.: 312).  
It has already been mentioned earlier that EMT tends to be eurocentric and to generally favor 
technologically advanced countries (Buttel 2000: 64 and Huber 2011b: 294). This criticism can 
also be brought forward from a SD-perspective, as an unequal distribution of chances might 
be counterproductive towards securing the basic needs of all human beings. It could also be 
in line with Ulrich Brand´s (2010) critique of SD and EMT as being hegemonic discourses, even 
though this clearly depends on the notion of sustainability used as a basis for one´s 
argument, as Brand seems to base his argument on a weak form of sustainability. 
From a strong notion of sustainability, EMT can also be criticized for being anthropocentric 
and thus paying insufficient attention to the interests and needs of nature (Pepper 1998: 1). 
David Pepper has nonetheless shown that even from a strong concept of sustainability a 
“homocentric” (Ibid.: 2) perspective towards SD could be established by conceptualizing 
humanity as a steward of nature. 
EMT can also be criticized for overlooking long-term effects in favor of short-term gains 
regarding environmental impacts. Jeffrey Sachs for example calls for nuclear power and 
carbon sequestration in order to reduce the emissions of GHGs (2011: 8). His argumentation is 
based on the premises of growing levels of economic activity as well as a growing world 
population and he argues for technological innovations (i.e. ecological modernization) being 
the only lever humanity could realistically adjust (without raising severe moral issues). I do not 
want to challenge his argument in general – which is very sound – and also not to indulge in 
technological pessimism, but I do have to make the normative claim that caution is to be 
applied regarding technological solutions that might bring with them other long-term 
problems. 
Despite this criticism it should not be overlooked, that there are also vatious overlaps 
between SD and EMT. Especially when analyzed from a weak concept of sustainability, the 
two concepts seem to share a lot. As I have argued earlier, SD goes beyond EMT, but EMT 
“...should be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustainable development 
(…). Conflating the two is not only counterproductive for the broader agenda of sustainable 
84 Out of WCED´s report ´Our Common Future´ (1987), Langhelle derives “...a hierarchy of priorities and weighing of different concerns inherent in the 
concept of sustainable development. (…): 
 the satisfaction of human needs, in particular, the essential needs of the world´s poor to which overriding priority should be given; 
 climate change (and thus the energy issue); 
 loss of biological diversity; 
 pollution (polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), radioactive pollution, acid rain, etc.); 
 food security“ (2000: 318). 
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 development, but also for the environmental policies necessary for realizing sustainable 
development” (Langhelle 2000: 318-319). What is needed for SD is a type of ecological 
modernization that goes beyond merely raising the efficiency of productive processes and 
minimizing their environmental effects – a type of EMT that produces a structural change of 
the global industry on the basis of new technologies and eco-innovations (Huber 2011a: 171).  
It seems like this pragmatic approach was at the core of what the UN were aiming at by 
promoting the notion of a Green Economy (GE) at UNCSD in June 2012. 
 
4.2. The Green Economy 
 
Following a decision by the UN General Assembly from December 2009 (Panitchpakdi 2011: 
1), UNCSD took place in Rio de Janeiro from June 20th-22nd 2012. Expectations for the 
summit differed in the academic community, depending on the specific topics (Schreuers 
2012; Woodruff 2012; Gosovic 2011), but were generally meager and/or pessimistic (e.g. 
Runnalls 2011:4; Clemencon 2012: 10; Haas 2012). 
In the end, the final outcome document (UN 2012a) was already presented on June 19th, the 
day before the beginning of the conference´s high-level-segment. In the forefront the host 
Brazil had intensively pushed for the acceptance of a final document in order to avoid any 
failure in the eyes of the global public sphere as had happened in Copenhagen at the 
UNFCCC´s COP-15. Despite official statement´s like UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon 
praising the conference as “a success” (UN News Centre 2012), especially civil-society 
organizations regarded the document as being unambitious or even stepping backwards 
with regard to the 1992 Rio-declaration (e.g. Greenpeace 2012; Germanwatch 2012; WBGU 
2012). 
The two main themes of the conference were fixed early on (UN 2010): (1) green economy in 
the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and (2) the institutional 
framework for sustainable development85.  
The latter is the manifestation of a debate that is not new: the question of a reform of the 
United Nations system due to institutional weaknesses that hinder the implementation of an 
effective environmental and sustainability governance (e.g. Bauer et al 2012; WBGU 2000; 
Rechkemmer 2006). The core issues that were debated in this field were reforms of UNEP, the 
Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD), the United Nation´s Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) and the United Nations General Assembly (UN 2012b) with the overall goal 
of further integrating and strengthening the international framework for sustainable 
development. Due to considerations of space, I will not go into more detail regarding these 
issues, however, the final outcome document “The Future We Want” (UN 2012a) failed to 
achieve any progress that goes beyond an unspecified financial upgrade of UNEP and the 
initiation of a reform process for the CSD that seems to be completely open, as it fails to 
specify anything that goes beyond what the to-be-established “High Level political forum” 
could do (UN 2012a: §85)86. 
85 Other issues discussed at the conference – or more precisely: during the preparation conferences - were food security, water, energy, cities, green jobs, 
oceans and seas, natural disasters, climate change, forests and biodiversity, land degradation and desertification, mountains, chemicals and waste, sustainable 
consumption and production, education, gender equality, finance, science and technology, capacity building and trade (UN 2012b). The multitude of issues 
addressed has been identified as one of the possible reasons for lack of ambition of the final outcome document (WBGU 2012).  
86 For a more thorough discussion regarding these outcomes see for example WBGU 2012; Germanwatch 2012 or Bachmann 2012. 
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 However, what is of interest to us here is the first topic: green economy in the context of 
sustainable development. The concept itself has been used increasingly since the General 
Assembly´s decision to initiate the process leading to the conference. In order to prepare for 
the conference UNEP launched a Green Economy Initiative and prepared a “Green Economy 
Report” (2011) and the OECD also issued a report about “Green Growth” (OECD 2011). Both 
concepts are well-thought, address multiple issues and create complex concepts that are 
based on the premises established by EMT: continuing growth, a focus on eco-innovations 
and a decoupling of economy and ecology. 
From a pragmatic point of view, it could be argued that continuing growth is a necessary 
prerequisite in order to achieve the support of the developing countries: “For poorer 
countries, development is an indispensable requirement for environmental protection” 
(Dasgupta 2011: 33). This also explains the strong linkage between the green economy, 
sustainable development and poverty eradication that can be found in the official UN 
documents dealing with the green economy. In fact the term “green economy” is only 
mentioned four times without the suffix “in the context of sustainable development and 
poverty eradication” in the final outcome document (and 19 times with the suffix). The UN 
General Secretary has also highlighted the connection between economic growth and 
poverty reduction (UN 2010: 4). 
So what exactly is a green economy? Despite or maybe because of the wide use of the term it 
is quite challenging to give a precise definition (Cozendey 2011: 39; also Brand 2012: 28; Haas 
2012: 97). On a very general basis, agreement seems to exist on a green economy being 
characterized by low levels of carbon emissions, as well as energy and resource efficiency and 
the further integration of formerly marginalized groups. According to UNEP´s Executive 
Director Achim Steiner: “In its simplest expression, a green economy can be thought of as one 
which is low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive” (Steiner 2011: 12; also UNEP 
2011: 2). Green Economy can probably best be seen as a “menu of policy options” (Dasgupta 
2011: 34). This lack of a concrete vision is also one of the central weaknesses of the concept: 
“...there is as yet few academic or popular writings [sic] that clearly explains or defines the 
green economy, or how to transition to it. Without such intellectual focal points – such as the 
role played by the Limits to Growth in the early international environmental movement – it 
remains difficult to mobilize action around such a new campaign project” (Haas 2012: 97).  
Furthermore, the wide definition by Steiner and UNEP opens up a lot of questions: What are 
enabling conditions that support the transition to a green economy? Do certain technologies 
(e.g. nuclear power, carbon-capture-and-storage, resistant trans-genetic organisms) qualify as 
low-carbon, even though they might be unsustainable? How can the differences in the 
abilities of countries to transition to a green economy be alleviated? Who will profit from a 
green economy and who will lose or be excluded from the benefits87? 
Finally, questions regarding the financing of the transition to a green economy are of crucial 
importance: UNEP´s Green Economy Report identifies a misallocation of capital as the main 
reason for the current ecological, social and economic crises (UNEP 2011: 1). It further 
estimates that an average mobilization of 2% of global GDP per year (about $1,3 trillion 
annually) would be necessary in order to finance a transition to a global green economy 
(UNEP 2011: 35). Where should this money come from? Some governments included green 
technology in their stimulus packages between 2008 and 2010 (Haas 2012: 98) and public 
financing has been identified as crucial for jump-starting the transition (UNEP 2011: 36). 
Nevertheless, public financing will be insufficient, (a) in terms of size, and (b) if the incentive 
87 With regard to Rio+20´s outcome document “The Future We Want“, the question can be asked, who exactly is ´We´? Even the range of measures that 
UNEP proposed has been argued to (although only slightly) disadvantage developing countries in relation to developing countries if the latter implement them 
unilaterally (Cosbey 2011). As unilateral implementation is at the core of bottom-up-approaches as well as EMT with its focus on eco-innovation and pioneer 
countries, this is an important point of criticism. 
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 structures for private investment remain unchanged and thus steer investment towards 
energy and resource intensive fields (Runnells 2011: 5): “A Green Economy is not possible 
without a stable global financial system underpinned by open, accountable, transparent, and 
responsible capital markets. (…) The financial system needs to recognize such factors in its 
core processes and reward structures” (Ibid.). In designing effective policies for the transition 
toward a green economy, it would thus be important to gain the support of the financial 
services and investment sectors (UNEP 2011: 35), as well as to create major international 
funding mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund (Ibid.: 36) and to reallocate monetary 
streams of international development funding (Ibid.: 37).  
 
4.3. The Green Economy in “The Future We Want” 
 
So what exactly is “The Future We Want” with regard to a green economy? Rio+20´s outcome 
document88 remains impressively unspecific regarding the green economy: the paragraphs 
dealing with the green economy do not contain the terms decide or we will at all, but are 
rather dominated by unambitious terminology like affirm (4 times), recognize (6 times), 
acknowledge (5 times), encourage (4 times) or invite (5 times).  
Already the first paragraph (§56) dealing with the issue steers the term in the direction of 
being an unspecific and weak concept by referring to the different conditions and 
possibilities available to each country, quite similar to the Rio-Declaration´s principle 7 
(Common But Differentiated Responsibility). It is also mentioned that the green economy 
should be a part of sustainable development and not a replacement for it. This is consistent 
with EMT which views ecological modernization as necessary condition for sustainable 
development. Further references to EMT can also be found in Paragraphs 67 (leadership by 
individual countries) and 72 (importance of technology and innovation).  
The constant reference to sustainable development has also been attributed to governments 
not being able to agree on a common vision of a green economy and thus relying on SD as a 
base of reference (Haas 2012: 97). The connection of the green economy to SD is also 
weakened as the consideration of SD is constrained to national circumstances: “We recognize 
the importance of the evaluation of the range of social, environmental and economic factors 
and encourage, where national circumstances and conditions allow, their integration into 
decision-making” (UN 2012: §63; italics added).  
Furthermore, the green economy is framed merely as a set of options rather than rules: “...we 
consider green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication 
as one of the important tools available for achieving sustainable development and that it 
could provide options for policymaking but should not be a rigid set of rules” (Ibid.: §56). The 
specification of green economy policies is being left to each country: “...we recognize that 
each country can choose an appropriate approach in accordance with national sustainable 
development plans, strategies and priorities” (Ibid.: §59).  
Even the goals that a green economy should pursue are only spelled out in a very general 
way: “We emphasize that it should contribute to eradicating poverty as well as sustained 
economic growth, enhancing social inclusion, improving human welfare and creating 
opportunities for employment and decent work for all, while maintaining the healthy 
functioning of the Earth´s ecosystems” (Ibid.: §56). Even though these goals are without a 
88 Chapter III (“Green Economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication“) of “The Future We Want“ consists of the paragraphs 
56-74 and deals with the green economy. 
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 doubt laudable, they are still highly open to interpretation (e.g. how should poverty and 
social inclusion be operationalized? How is human welfare being measured? When does an 
ecosystem´s functioning qualify as ´healthy´?). From a holistic perspective on the term 
ecosystem, it could also be criticized that throughout the whole document it is being used in 
its plural version89. An integrated, holistic approach that is based on the premise of one 
global ecosystem and multiple local, regional and also large scale ecosystems that are 
embedded in it, would certainly be more appropriate towards solving global environmental 
problems. It would however increase the complexity to be solved by political responses. 
The subsequent paragraph (57) specifies the legal surrounding in accordance to which a 
green economy should be developed: the Rio-Principles, Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Plan 
of Action and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These references can be attributed 
to – as I have mentioned above – the lack of a common vision of a green economy (Ibid.: §57). 
Nevertheless, these multiple points of reference bear the danger of creating windows of 
opportunity for forum shopping regarding unsustainable practices: just to give one example, 
the cultivation of crops resistant to pesticides or herbicides could be legitimized with 
contributing to MDG 1.c (halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger), while at 
the same time the intensive use of poisons would negatively impact biodiversity.  
On the other hand, the unambitious reference to some of the more concrete international 
agreements has to be criticized as well, as these would have opened up possibilities – 
together with a generally more ambitious language – to provide linkages to central elements 
of global environmental governance. Especially the weak reference regarding the three Rio-
Conventions90 (UNFCCC), the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) 
and the United Nations Convention on Combating Desertification (UNCCD)91) has to be 
criticized. Countries are only called upon to implement their commitments under the 
conventions, but not to further develop these (Ibid.: §17). Also, they are not called upon to 
take these conventions into account when designing green economy policies. A lost chance 
that further weakens an already unambitious document. 
So how should the green economy become reality? Basically, two approaches are elaborated 
on in the document. First, there are green economy policies. I have mentioned already that 
the specification and implementation of green economy policies is left to the individual 
countries. There are, however, some general remarks in Paragraph 58 on what green 
economy policies “should”92 do (UN 2012: §58; italics added). Some of these policy goals 
could be considered rhetorical standards in international agreements (consistency with 
international law; respect of national sovereignty and circumstances; respect of human rights; 
strengthening of international cooperation; gender equality; acknowledging special needs of 
developing countries; enhancement of welfare). Other goals are related to the green 
economy being based on EMT (promoting economic growth; foster innovation; promoting 
sustainable patterns of consumption and production; the role of technology gaps). The goal 
of avoiding “unwarranted conditionalities on official development aid (ODA) and finance” 
(Ibid.: §58/g) is probably due to developing countries´ concerns that green economy policies 
implemented by developed countries might impose restrictions on developing countries, e.g. 
by introducing trade barriers like BTAs or impose conditionalities on ODA. It is also stated as a 
goal that green economy policies should avoid imposing restrictions on international trade 
which is a clear reference to the international trade regime and a recognition of possible 
policy conflicts between this regime and national green economy policies. Lastly, a reference 
89 The only exceptions are fixed terms that use the singular version, e.g. ecosystem approach, ecosystem services or ecosystem conservation. 
90 Even though UNCCD was signed in 1994, it still derived out of the Rio-process and thus these three conventions are commonly referenced as the Rio-
Conventions. 
91 See Rechkemmer 2004 for an extensive analysis of UNCCD; also see Bauer et al. 2009 for a comparison of the three conventions´ secretariats. 
92 The use of a subjunctive in this context fits well with the generally unambitious approach pursued in “The Future We Want“. 
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 is made to the welfare of indigenous people which could also be considered standard 
rhetoric of international treaties if it would not be for the further remark that green economy 
policies should “...avoid endangering [indigenous people´s] cultural heritage, practices and 
traditional knowledge, preserving and respecting non-market approaches that contribute to 
the eradication of poverty” (Ibid.: §58/j). The explicit acknowledging of non-market 
approaches (even if it is only limited to special circumstances) is interesting, as it is somewhat 
contrary to the dominance of market based approaches since UNCED in 1992.  
It should be highlighted however that all the policy goals listed in paragraph 58 are 
formulated in the subjunctive. It does not say what green economy policies will or have to do, 
but merely what they “should” (Ibid.: §58) do. This certainly does open up opportunities for 
progressive governments and civil-society organizations to use these formulations in order to 
further push sustainable processes and increase legitimatory pressure on governments and 
economic actors engaging in unsustainable practices (Germanwatch 2012: 9). However, it also 
opens up opportunities for the latter actors to disguise an adherence to the status-quo 
behind outwardly green practices – or greenwashing, to use the more popular expression 
(Ibid.). 
This leads us to the second approach that is outlined in order to make the green economy 
become reality: the involvement of stakeholders and especially business actors. It has already 
been mentioned earlier that UNEP´s green economy report does highlight the importance of 
mobilizing private funding in order to finance the transition towards a green economy (UNEP 
2011: 35). The document thus explicitly calls for the establishment of partnerships (including 
PPPs) to “mobilize public funding complemented by the private sector” (UN 2012: §71). 
Furthermore, business and industry actors are invited (Ibid.: §69) to contribute to sustainable 
development by including green economy strategies into their sustainability strategies. There 
is also a distinction regarding the types of economic actors that are seen as valuable 
contributors towards the transition to a green economy: as cooperatives and 
microenterprises are only seen as contributing to social inclusion and poverty relief in 
developing countries (Ibid.: §70), they are by this rhetorical twist indirectly excluded from the 
list of relevant actors, as poverty relief and social inclusion are also among the core goals of 
green economy (Ibid.: §58).  
Phasing out subsidies on fossil fuels is a key issue for the transformation towards a green 
economy (UNEP 2011: 30-31). Direct and indirect subsidies by governments create perverse 
incentives that prevent the transition towards sustainable patterns of production and 
consumption. This is not only an issue for developed countries with their energy intensive 
lifestyles, but also concerns developed countries that often hand subsidies directly to the 
consumers (Runnells 2011: 7). The issue has been addressed at G-20 summits since 2009 and 
subsequently recerived increasing attention by other international organizations like the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), the Organization of Petrol Exporting Countries (OPEC), the 
OECD and the World Bank, but has lost its initial momentum since then (Ibid.: 8). UNCSD 
would have been an opportunity to regain momentum, but it failed in achieving this, as the 
outcome document merely invites countries to “consider rationalizing inefficient fossil fuel 
subsidies (…) and phasing out harmful subsidies” (UN 2012: §225).  
“The Future We Want” is lacking any timetables or guidelines (or initiation of processes that 
would formulate these) that would establish a base of reference for a green economy. The 
insufficiency of the gross domestic product (GDP) as the sole indicator for welfare is being 
recognized (Ibid.: §38), but the mandate to formulate an alternative set of indicators is being 
given to the UN Statistical Commission without further specification to draw on work that has 
already been done in this field (e.g. the French government´s Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, the Human Development Index 
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 or the OECD Better Life Index). As there is no precise definition regarding what constitutes a 
green economy specifically (not to mention the constant reference to the other oxymoron, 
sustainable development), business actors do have ample opportunities to declare many of 
their practices as being in line with a green economy and/or sustainable development. 
It seems as if the green economy as it is outlined in “The Future We Want” is strongly 
endangered of being utilized for a greenwash economy rather than a green economy. On the 
one hand, participation of stakeholders is being highlighted as highly important to the 
successful transition. But on the other hand, it seems to be limited to certain stakeholders, as 
paragraph 71 limits the interests of local and indigenous communities as only to be taken into 
account “when appropriate” (Ibid.: §71). A slap in the face of local and indigenous activists. 
In sum, UNCSD produced a document that initiated a process of normative standard setting 
regarding a green economy. The norms established are very general and open to 
interpretation and it thus only creates a weak green economy regime. It does nevertheless 
bear the characteristics of a regime, as there are principles (the dominating modes of 
production and consumption are unsustainable), norms (the global economy needs to be 
reorganized in order to put on the path to sustainability), rules (guidelines for green economy 
policies are specified) and decision-making structures (formulation of green economy policies 
is to be achieved at the national level and public and private actors should pursue the path to 
a green economy collectively with support from the UN system, donors and international 
organizations, who should coordinate and provide information “upon request” (Ibid.: §66)). If 
this green economy regime is to be effective at all, much will depend on individual countries 
taking leadership and delivering examples of successful transitions.  
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 5. Synergies and Conflicts of climate and green economy governance 
 
As a part of the international agenda to implement sustainable development, the green 
economy should also support the efforts to tackle climate change. This was certainly kept in 
mind by UNEP prior to UNCSD, as a green economy was framed as being “low carbon” (UNEP 
2011: 2; Steiner 2011: 12). Drawing on the typology of institutional interactions developed by 
Gehring and Oberthür (2009) that has been described in chapter 2.6, synergies can be 
observed at all four levels (cognitive, interaction, behavioral, impact-level). 
As the problems addressed by both regimes are connected quite closely, cognitive 
interaction is likely to produce synergies. More specifically, the green economy establishes a 
policy model on which economic transitions are to be based. Unfortunately, “The Future We 
Want” does not make any references to a green economy being low-carbon, but merely 
contributing to “...our ability to manage natural resources sustainably and with lower 
negative environmental impacts, increase resource efficiency and reduce waste” (UN 2012: 
§60). Synergies through cognitive interaction will thus depend on public and private actors´ 
will to include decreasing GHG-levels in their green economy and sustainability strategies. 
The coordinating role of the UN system and other relevant international organizations set 
forth in paragraph 66 also bears the potential of synergistic cognitive interaction. The 
strengthening and upgrading of UNEP that was decided at UNCSD (UN 2012: §88) could play 
a crucial role here as UNEP was always envisioned to be a coordinator for international 
environmental politics, but ultimately lacked the resources to fulfill this role to the fullest 
extent. During the preparation of UNCSD scientists have proposed the creation of an 
International Green Economy Organization to evaluate policies pursued at the national level 
of major economies (Charnovitz 2012). As UNCSD failed to specify which part of the UN 
system or which international organizations should fulfill the role of a coordinator, time will 
tell whether one organization will take the lead or whether multiple organizations will try to 
establish themselves as coordinators and thus potentially create confusion rather than 
coordination. 
Interaction through commitment could also produce synergies between the two regimes. 
Specific national reduction targets for GHG reduction could induce technological innovations 
in lead markets and vice versa. Successful transformations towards more sustainable patterns 
of production and consumption could serve as both, examples and incentives for other 
countries to follow. An example could be the successful transformation of the German energy 
sector (“Energiewende”) as it was envisioned by the German government (Bundesregierung 
2012). Germany as one of the world´s major industries could inspire other governments with 
an ambitious pursuit of the transition of the energy sector. Another example would be a 
further development of the world trade regime in order to the trade in less carbon-intensive 
products and technologies, which would then contribute to both: effective climate 
governance and support the technology-based approach envisioned by ecological 
modernization. 
Behavioral interaction could also create synergies between the two regimes. An example 
could be the implementation of green economy policies in the USA. Synergies through 
behavioral interaction are likely if there is a difference of membership between two regimes. 
As the USA are not a member of the Kyoto-Protocol, green economy policies could contribute 
to the reduction of GHGs in the USA and thus increase the success of the UN legal regime on 
climate change. 
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 Lastly, synergies could also be created through interaction at the impact-level. The successful 
implementation of green economy policies and the corresponding changes in production 
and consumption patterns would also impact the success of the climate regime complex, as 
GHGs would be reduced. Vice versa, the supply of the Green Climate Fund with significant 
amounts of funding could contribute to achieving progress towards transitioning to (low-
carbon) green economies in developing countries. 
It seems plausible to assume that even the framework for a green economy (as vague as it is) 
contained in “The Future We Want”, was designed and negotiated in order to create synergies 
with the climate regime complex, or at least the UN´s legal regime on climate change. 
However, due to the unspecific nature of the green economy regime, an interesting question 
is: where are possible points of friction between the two regimes? It should be highlighted 
though that the disruptive effects described below are not path-dependencies. My aim is to 
elaborate on possible disruptions. Careful policy design and responsible behavior could help 
avoiding these.  
According to the framework developed by Gehring and Oberthür (2009), interaction through 
commitment between two regimes only produces synergies, so I will leave this case out in 
this analysis. 
Cognitive interaction between two regimes can produce disruptive results if key areas of 
governance and membership overlap, but the objectives are differing, thus creating 
competition for regulatory authority (Ibid.: 146). As I have argued in chapter 3, the climate 
regime complex is in a phase of transition. With the Kyoto Protocol expiring in 2020 at the 
latest and a new agreement for the time after to be negotiated by 2015, the mode of 
governance is likely to change to a more bottom-up style. The framework for a green 
economy as it was developed at UNCSD could serve as a base of reference and thus assert 
some influence on the direction the climate regime complex is taking. The term of sustainable 
development did this for the Rio-conventions (Brand 2012: 28) and the green economy could 
have similar impact on climate governance. The danger however is that a reference base that 
is defined by its adherence to growth and modernization could contribute to the new legal 
regime being less ambitious. The old top-down-style of the Kyoto Protocol imposed fixed 
reduction targets that had to be achieved. This imposed restrictions on the economic growth 
rates that a country (at least those covered by Annex B) could be able to achieve. As climate 
governance is steering towards a more bottom-up style of governance and growth is now 
being a central part of the international agenda for sustainability, the green economy bears 
the potential to limit the ambition of future climate governance. 
Behavioral interaction between the two regimes is another area that is prone to producing 
disruptive effects. These effects are likely to occur when there are conflicting or competing 
obligations and an overlap of governance areas (Gehring / Oberthür 2009: 147). Again the 
problem is the unambitious language in “The Future We Want”. Whereas the climate regime 
complex contains specifications (in the UN´s legal regime) regarding the areas (i.e. GHGs and 
sectors) to be covered, the green economy as outlined at UNCSD is quite unspecific regarding 
where exactly a transition should take place. This puts pressure on national governments that 
need to formulate their respective political frameworks in a way that makes it unlikely to 
declare actions as contributing to a green economy, while at the same time GHG emissions 
are increased or not lowered. If a country would for example decide to green its public 
transportation sector by using biofuels, or by establishing a mandatory quota of biofuels in 
relation to the total amount of fuels, this could create problems: first, it could be inefficient, as 
the price of a ton of carbon avoided with biofuels could amount to up to 600$/ton, and 
second, biofuels are often net contributors to climate change, if the refineries are powered 
with electricity from coal power plants (Runnells 2011: 7). Also, biofuel production increases 
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 competition for agricultural land and increases pressure on forests, as deforestation is often 
connected either directly to biofuel production or indirectly through new agricultural land 
being needed for food production as the old areas are in use for biofuel production 
(Searchinger et al. 2008). Deforestation is also a main contributor to anthropogenic GHG 
emissions (IPCC 2007: 36). 
Lastly, disruptions between the climate regime complex and the green economy regime can 
also occur through impact-level interaction. This happens when the ultimate governance 
target of one institution influences the ultimate governance target of another institution 
(Gehring / Oberthür 2009: 147). A potential source for conflicts between the two regimes is 
the overarching goal of poverty eradication that is given for the green economy. Whereas the 
central normative of the climate regime complex is the reduction of GHG emissions and 
ultimately the impediment of anthropogenic climate change, the green economy regime 
aims for development that is based on growth. As it is unlikely that clean technologies will be 
available to all countries immediately (and are not even available at all in some sectors), 
countries (and especially developing countries) are likely to implement carbon intensive 
patterns of development. As investments follow a certain path dependency due to the 
required time for amortization, the green economy might in fact fix a carbon-intensive path 
of development. International donors could counter this problem by applying conditionalities 
for low-carbon projects on the issuing of funding. This is nonetheless problematic due to two 
reasons: first, “unwarranted conditionalities on official development assistance (ODA) and 
finance” have been ruled out (UN 2012: §58/g). The question of which conditionalities are 
warranted and which are not is quite frankly open to interpretation. Second, even if 
conditionalities were to be applied, public and international funding could only account for 
parts of the funding necessary to support the transition to a green economy. The bulk would 
have to come from private investors and companies. As their behavior could only be 
regulated at the domestic level, their activities in developing countries would have to be 
regulated by these countries. An event that seems unlikely, considering that poverty 
eradication is developing countries´ first priority and they therefore have an incentive to 
attract foreign direct investment. 
The green economy framework developed at UNCSD will certainly influence the climate 
regime complex. Synergistic as well as disruptive interactions between the two can occur at 
multiple levels of institutional interaction. It has to be repeated though that the interactions 
elaborated on above are possibilities for interaction, not path-dependent interactions. Much 
will depend on national governance (e.g. green economy and sustainability strategies), 
commitments and activities of non-state actors as well as the course of the climate change 
regime complex and especially the UN legal regime after 2015. Ambitious approaches by all 
actors involved could certainly help to achieve global environmental governance that is 
capable and well-equipped to deal with the problems of the world´s environment. Clubs like 
the G-20, the Major Emitters Forum or the Asian Pacific Partnership contain some of the 
world´s major emitters and could thus play an important role in promoting both, ambitious 
climate governance as well as the implementation of sound green economy policies and thus 
contribute to sustainable development and poverty alleviation. 
On the other hand, there is the danger that the unambitious terminology of the recent 
UNCSD´s final outcome document and possibly the future legal regime on climate change 
will undermine ambitious and effective governance. A necessary condition for this would be 
that industrialized countries were taking the lead in transitioning to truly sustainable patterns 
of production and consumption. Or as Branislav Gosovic puts it:  
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 “While the ´green economy´ offers useful solutions and approaches which need to be 
pursued in the quest for sustainable development, unless it is placed in an integrated context 
it is likely to result in new forms of inequalities and problems between the advanced and 
developing countries. And it should not be reduced to or subjected to such incentives as 
greening corporate image, profit, the development and export of new technologies, the 
creation of new jobs or the energy independence in a single or a handful of developed 
countries” (Gosovic 2011: 91) 
 
However, this would imply questioning the dominant lifestyles and requiring cognitive 
change. Furthermore, most industrialized countries seem preoccupied with the current fiscal 
and economic crisis. The prospects for effective sustainability governance that tackles climate 
change and contributes to development and the social on a global scale seem dim. The 
engagement of non-governmental and sub-national actors could be the crucial leverage: 
companies implementing sound sustainability strategies, civil-society organizations 
campaigning for individual engagement and more sustainable lifestyles and local 
governments voluntarily steering their communities towards carbon-neutrality and 
inclusiveness.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Climate change governance has evolved into an increasingly complex field with multiple 
actors and institutions. Since the issue of climate change has emerged in the 1950s, it has 
become one of the central issues of global environmental governance. The complexity of the 
issue has resulted in a legal regime at the UN-level being developed and subsequently 
complemented by bilateral and multilateral initiatives and overlaps with other regimes and 
organizations dealing with related subjects. A complex system of regimes and organizations 
has evolved that is characterized by different approaches to regulation and governance. 
Whereas top-down governance in the form of internationally agreed reduction targets 
dominated during the last two decades, there is now a tendency towards softer bottom-up 
modes of political steering characterized by voluntary commitments and less ambitious 
formulations in international treaties. The Kyoto Protocol never covered the majority of GHG 
emissions and even those countries covered by it have partly failed to achieve their targets or 
never even ambitiously pursued the goal of reducing their emissions. The top-down 
approach of global environmental governance as exemplified in the Kyoto Protocol could 
therefore be called a failure. The development of softer approaches thus seems to be the 
pragmatic reaction towards this insight. 
Soft modes of governance also characterize the green economy as it was framed at UNCSD. 
The outcome document is highly open to interpretation and contains both: the possibility for 
committed governments and non-governmental actors to pursue and push for a transition 
towards a sustainable economy, but also plenty of options for countries and business actors 
to engage in green-washing while sticking to business-as-usual. Individual countries and 
companies will have to go ahead and foster innovation and support the transition towards 
more sustainable modes of production and consumption. Non-governmental organizations 
could support this transition by campaigning for this transition at various levels: by asserting 
pressure on corporations, providing knowledge for the formulation of policies or by 
supporting individuals in their transition towards a more sustainable lifestyle, just to name a 
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 few. As UNCSD has not produced a precise account of a green economy, national 
governments and ambitious non-governmental actors will have to take the lead in defining 
what constitutes a truly green economy. The term is already in danger of being an oxymoron, 
but without efforts to frame it in line with ambitious targets, it will end up being a mere 
public relations tool. The lack of a common vision for change makes it hard to provide 
anything that goes beyond criticizing the status-quo. 
UNCSD initiated a regime formation process for a green economy regime. Even though 
principles, norms and rules have been formulated in a very generalized way, decision-making 
structures remain very much limited to the national level, as no international organization has 
been tasked with creating a common vision for a green economy and the outcome document 
makes this prospect seem rather unlikely. It could be argued that “The Future We Want” 
contains some guidelines for decision-making structures, as stakeholders that should be 
included are clearly named. Also, green economy is always referenced as ´in the context of 
sustainable development and poverty alleviation´ and this is where one should place the 
decision-making making structures of the green economy regime: at the level of international 
institutions dealing with these issues, e.g. the United Nations system. Also regime complex 
theory offers valuable insights, as the analysis of influences the green economy has in regime 
complexes might be more fruitful than the analysis of a single green economy regime itself. 
Due to the unspecific nature of the green economy regime, synergies as well as disruptions 
with the climate change regime complex could be achieved. Inside the climate regime 
complex interactions at multiple levels could produce synergies as well as disruptions. 
Synergies seem likely at the level of cognitive interaction, e.g. if green economy would indeed 
become an  integral part of environmental policy making and thus also assert influence on 
the formation of the future UN legal regime. Furthermore, interactions through commitment 
as well as behavioral interaction and interaction at the impact level could produce synergies. 
Disruptive effects are to be expected at three of these levels, namely cognitive interaction, 
interaction through commitment and impact-level interaction. 
Much will however depend on the national implementation and inclusion of green economy 
policies. Integrative policies that aim to lessen negative side effects and fully take account of 
the whole range of issues covered as well as integrate all relevant stakeholders in decision-
making processes could create synergies for both regimes. On the other hand, unambitious 
national policies open the door for corporations to engage in green-washing their activities as 
well as for countries to provide incentives for forum shopping by creating weak green 
economy legislation. 
I am very skeptical regarding the positive effects of green economy policies. Approaches 
based on Ecological Modernization Theory have many deficits, ranging from the types of 
environmental problems that they are actually able to solve, over inadequacies of the 
methods the theory proposes, up to questions of equality and fairness regarding the chances 
to participate. The way green economy was formulated at UNCSD is to vague to be a solid 
base for solving the climate crisis and other global environmental problems like the loss of 
biodiversity. There also seems to be a potential trade-off between poverty alleviation and 
global environmental problems. Whereas the latter would require a down-scaling of the 
global economy in order to reduce the environmental impacts of economic activities, the 
former would effectively require an up-scaling of many economies in developing countries. If 
one looks at the long time it took to negotiate the UNCBD´s Nagoya Protocol (which regulates 
access and benefit sharing regarding biodiversity) as an example, it seems unlikely that the 
industrialized countries of the North and the majority of large national and transnational 
corporations are willing to engage in the transfer of technology that would be necessary in 
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 order to achieve a worldwide transition towards truly sustainable patterns of production and 
consumption. 
I do not want to be too pessimistic about the power of the individuals that make up society. 
The Arab Spring has given us impressive examples of the power citizens can assert over the 
state. But as long as the nation state and it´s perceived interests are at the forefront of 
decision-making, even the power of the people is not going to save the environment. As long 
as individual countries´ and companies´ interests dominate decision-making and pursue their 
rational self-interest – as economists like to call it – I doubt that the most pressing 
environmental problems will be halted. This is not a call for an abolishment of rationality, 
quite the contrary, but I do think that a Cartesian rational thinking has not only caused, but 
also prevented the solution of ecological problems. After all it was Descartes´ famous ´cogito 
ergo sum´ that placed the separation of man from the environment at the heart of the 
enlightenment and thus modern societies. An environmental policy-making that relies on 
pure rationality is doomed to fail, as it neglects humanity as being an integral part of nature. 
Climate governance bears the potential to address its issue in such a holistic way, as it is 
concerned with the mutual influence of humanity and its environment. With the current 
course of the climate regime complex towards bottom-up modes of governance and the 
green economy being framed in a similar way, it seems doubtful to me though, whether 
interactions between governance in the two issue-areas will sufficiently solve any of the 
addressed problems. 
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